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Four papers investigate the neural signatures of close other representations in young and 
older adults. The first paper connects neuroimaging and attachment theory within a novel social, 
cognitive, and affective framework. Attachment theory is applied to understand why we would 
expect cognitive representations of close others to be different from other social neural 
representations. Existing neuroimaging literature on close other representations is examined, 
highlighting the recruitment of neural systems supporting reward, motivation, and distress 
alleviation, in addition to the mirror neuron system, default network, and salience network. 
Methodologies of past studies are reviewed, revealing a diverse array of self-report measures 
assessing closeness and social cognitive tasks that, taken together, preclude meaningful synthesis 
of findings. Specific behavioral measures of attachment are discussed, with recommendations for 
the field. The second paper examines the neural representation of known others along a 
continuum of attachment using fMRI. Heterosexual adults in romantic relationships for more 
than two years, made trait judgments for various social targets. Across conditions, trait 
judgments engaged the default network and lateral prefrontal cortex. Judgments about oneself 
and a partner were associated with a common activation pattern encompassing anterior and 
middle cingulate, posterior superior temporal sulcus, as well as anterior insula. These results 
  
provide novel evidence that mentalizing about known familiar others results in differential brain 
activity and that adult attachment is a distinguishing feature of these differences. The third paper 
investigates the neural representation of known others in young and older adults, using the same 
trait judgment fMRI paradigm. Across both age groups, all trait judgments engaged default 
network regions such as dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex; however, older adults showed a lack of neural differentiation between social conditions. 
Both age groups demonstrated connectivity between dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex 
and other default network regions during trait judgments. However, older but not young adults 
also showed increased functional coupling between medial and lateral prefrontal brain regions. 
Results extend the dedifferentiation and default – executive coupling accounts of neurocognitive 
aging to social aging neuroscience. The fourth paper examines the neural representation 
specifically of parents and adult children, again using a trait judgment task in fMRI. Higher 
levels of parent and child attachment were associated with lower neural recruitment in anterior 
cingulate cortex, amygdala, posterior cingulate cortex, medial temporal lobe, and occipital face 
area. Results provide novel evidence for neural signatures of chronic accessibility, as bringing to 
mind one’s attached parent or child requires less engagement of brain regions involved in 
distress relief, memory, and facial processing. Taken together, the present studies utilize fMRI 
methods to contribute to an emergent neuroscience of close relationships and attachment. 
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  CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
As members of a highly social species, humans form and maintain close social 
relationships throughout the life course. These unique, stable relationships are often 
conceptualized as attachment bonds (Bowlby, 1973, 1982) and are associated with feelings of 
security conferred by attachment figures’ presence (Bowlby, 1982; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; 
Sroufe & Waters, 1977). Attachment theory posits that, in infancy, proximity maintenance to a 
primary caregiver is necessary for survival (Bowlby, 1982). This theoretical model has since 
been extended to explain attachments in adulthood, as well (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). The 
overarching attachment framework serves as a predominant paradigm for understanding the 
regulatory powers of our closest social bonds and the psychological and physiological health 
benefits conferred by these relationships (Hazan, Gur-Yaish, & Campa, 2004; Pietromonaco, 
Feldman Barrett, & Powers, 2006). 
However, physical proximity is not always needed for felt security; once one forms a 
mental representation of an attachment figure, he or she can utilize this same system of 
behavioral dynamics from that cognitive representation alone. The chronic accessibility of 
attachment figure mental representations (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Baldwin et al., 1996)—by 
which these representations are easily brought to mind and utilized—comes about due to 
learning and conditioning under the inborn system of attachment bonding. Mental 
representations of attachment figures, being chronically accessible and highly relevant for 
emotion-regulation, are inherently different from representations of others — acquaintances, 
friends, or even ourselves (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, & 
Powers, 2006). Attachment figure mental representations are, for one, often used effectively in 
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response to stressors (e.g., Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Grewen et al., 2003; Eisenberger 
et al., 2011; Selcuk et al., 2013). Importantly, there is growing evidence to support the notion 
that these cognitive representations of our closest relationship partners are also associated with 
unique patterns of brain response (e.g., Acevedo et al., 2012; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010).  
The present dissertation aims to advance our understanding of the neural signatures of 
close other representations, across adulthood. Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on close other 
representations, connecting neuroimaging and attachment theory within a novel social, cognitive, 
and affective framework. Attachment theory is discussed and applied to understand why we 
would expect cognitive representations of close others to be different from other social 
representations in the brain. This review highlights the recruitment of neural systems supporting 
reward, motivation, and distress alleviation, in addition to the mirror neuron system, default 
network, and salience network; critically examines the diverse methodologies of past studies; 
and provides recommendations for the field. Chapter 3 examines the neural representation of 
known others along a continuum of closeness using functional magnetic neuroimaging (fMRI) in 
young adults. This study provides one of the first pieces of evidence that mentalizing about 
known others results in differential brain activity and that adult attachment is a distinguishing 
feature of these differences.1 Chapter 4 again utilizes fMRI to investigate the neural 																																																								
1 Chapter 3 was previously published in the journal Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience 
(SCAN) (Copyright © 2017 by Oxford University Press. Reproduced with permission. The 
official citation that should be used in referencing this material is: Laurita, A.C., Hazan, C. & 
Spreng, R.N. (2017). Dissociable patterns of brain activity for mentalizing about known others: 
A role for attachment. Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience. No further reproduction or 
distribution is permitted without written permission from Oxford University Press). 
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representation of known others in both young and older adults. Findings demonstrate various 
interactions between aging and the representation of social closeness; for one, neural 
representations of close others become less differentiated in older adulthood. This study is one of 
the first to extend the dedifferentiation and default – executive coupling accounts of 
neurocognitive aging to social neuroscience. Chapter 5 uses fMRI to examine the neural 
representation of parents and adult children, looking specifically at how degree of attachment to 
these figures modulates associated brain activity. Results provide novel evidence for unique 
neural signatures of chronic accessibility, as bringing to mind one’s attached parent or child 
requires less engagement across a variety of brain regions. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses 
directions for future research on the neural representation of close others. Overall, the present 
studies utilize fMRI methods to contribute to an emergent neuroscience of close relationships 
and attachment. 
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CHAPTER 2 
An Attachment Theoretical Perspective for the Neural Representation of Close Others 
I love you without knowing how, or when, or from where,    
I love you straightforwardly, without complexities or pride; 
so I love you because I know no other way  
 
than this: where I does not exist, nor you,    
so close that your hand on my chest is my hand,    
so close that your eyes close as I fall asleep. 
 
-Pablo Neruda, One Hundred Love Sonnets: XVII, 1959;  
Translated by Stephen Tapscott 
 
If you are able to suspend disbelief for a moment, assume that two individuals’ bodies 
could so precisely synchronize as a function of mere affection. Then perhaps Neruda’s prose 
does accurately reflect feelings of intense love. His imagery evokes a level of intimacy and 
connection reserved only for certain close relationships. Humankind’s fascination with the 
experience of love and thinking about loved-ones stretches far back through history, long before 
Neruda wrote his sonnets. This curiosity flourishes today, too; the observation of biobehavioral 
synchrony, or the sensitization to and mirroring of another’s physiological and behavioral cues, 
in pair bonds (see Feldman, 2016, for review), for instance, provides intriguing support for this 
particular poetic musing. Across scientific domains we are relatively new to the formal 
exploration of close social bonds. Yet, we have already made great strides in amassing evidence 
for these unique attachment relationships that are operative across the lifespan and manifest in 
affect, behavior, cognition, and physiology. 
From an ethological perspective, interest in investigating close relationships stems from 
knowledge of the social pressures unique to the human species, such as navigation of complex 
social hierarchies and formation of successful mating relationships (see Fletcher et al., 2015, for 
review). Our ability to cognitively represent others and respond accordingly differentiates us 
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from our primate relatives (Tomasello, 1999). Evolutionary theorists postulated the social brain 
hypothesis to account for humans’ unique social-cognitive skills. As humans evolved, living in 
group settings, individuals had to manage increasing complexity and number of social 
relationships. This evolutionary pressure was associated with markedly larger brains (Dunbar, 
1998). The capacity to successfully navigate through personal interactions remains crucial for 
human survival. We understand that the formation and maintenance of close relationships is 
essential for defining one’s sense of self (Vygotsky, 1978), surviving to mate and raise young 
(Buss & Schmitt, 1993), and bolstering physical and mental health throughout the lifespan 
(Cohen, 2004; Cornwell & Waite, 2009; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Kiecolt-Glaser & 
Newton, 2001). The ability to stratify personal relationships—differentiating close from other 
more distal connections across social networks—is especially important for successful social 
navigation. 
Social-cognitive neuroscientists have begun to map this “social landscape” to the 
complex architecture of the brain. Patterns of neural activity have been identified that 
differentiate cognitive representations of close others from less-close others (e.g. Krienen, Tu, & 
Buckner, 2010). Yet, efforts to integrate social psychology and neuroscience research to define 
how one neurally represents close others have proven challenging; there are several persistent 
barriers, including the absence of a common theoretical framework, disparate research methods, 
and measurement challenges. In order to use measures of brain activity to make inferences about 
close other representations in the brain, the emerging field of close relationship neuroscience 
needs to make progress toward clearer measurements and evaluation of constructs defining close 
relationships. The present review connects past work, providing a common framework for 
understanding neural representations of close social relationship partners. We aim to show how 
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clear integration of a few, central concepts across the relevant bodies of literature provides a 
novel perspective for the emergent field of close relationship neuroscience and provides a path 
for future inquiry. 
Outline and Scope of the Present Review 
The primary objective of this review is to provide an integrated common framework for 
understanding the neural representation of our closest social relationships.	We begin with a 
survey of the theoretical and social psychological bases of attachment, examining how they 
inform social neuroscience research. We emphasize the potential for attachment theory to guide 
functional neuroimaging investigations of close other mental representations. The hallmark of 
attachment bonds is the feeling of security associated with attachment figures’ availability. 
Attachment theory suggests that behavior towards a certain close other differs fundamentally 
from behavior towards more distant others, signaling that neural representations of social others 
may be similarly stratified across a proximal-distal continuum. Utilizing criteria provided by 
attachment theory, by stratifying social relationships by self report of felt security, could provide 
the necessary framework to differentiate the corresponding neural representations. Attachment 
theory can provide neuroscientists with specific behavioral and cognitive constructs to examine.	
We next present recent and seminal social cognitive neuroscience studies which have 
implicated a wide array of brain regions in representing close relationships including: the 
dopaminergic and opioid reward systems; the limbic system in emotional regulation and distress 
alleviation; the mirror neuron system; the default network, responsible for internally-directed 
thought and social cognition; and the salience network in differentiation of unique close other 
representations. The studies we review adopted diverse approaches to operationalize and 
measure the construct of close other representations. In the next section of our review, we 
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evaluate these approaches. We discuss core methodological challenges in this area, including: 
use of terminology relating to close relationships and to attachment bonds; assessment of 
relationship length; use of self-report measures of relationship closeness and quality; differing 
neuroimaging task paradigms; and the potential impact of demographic factors such as sex, 
sexual orientation, and age. Of particular interest are experimental parameters reflecting how 
researchers measure “closeness” of close others in relation to neural responses. Such 
methodological discrepancies preclude meaningful integration of findings across concepts and 
fields. To conclude, we offer a series of recommendations designed to promote an 
interdisciplinary approach for mapping the neural representation of unique close relationships, 
conceptualized as attachment bonds. We review behavioral methods to assess attachment and 
close adult relationships with recommendations for the field. Developing reliable markers of 
attachment, grounded in social psychological theory, is a critical step in mapping close 
relationship representations in the human brain.   
As this inquiry comes at a critical time for close relationship neuroscience (see Feldman, 
2017, for review; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017), we seek to situate this work within a broader 
context of the disparate fields upon which it draws. First, we focus this review solely on close 
relationships in adulthood, gathering evidence primarily from studies of adult romantic 
relationships and secondarily from studies of parent/adult-child relationships or close adult 
friendships. We do not review studies of infants’ or children’s close relationships, nor do we 
review studies of clinical populations, adult or otherwise. Second, we utilize attachment theory 
as a normative, quantitative framework for our discussion. Motivated by Bowlby’s (1973) 
traditional model, our perspective hinges on the quantifiable presence (versus non-presence) of 
attachment to characterize close relationships. We do not approach attachment theory from 
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Ainsworth and colleagues’ (1978) tradition of observing attachment style; researchers have yet to 
integrate relationship-observational methods with collection of neuroimaging data, and we do not 
yet have sufficient data to delve into such individual differences. Third, we use specific language, 
discussing “close other representations” as a unifying construct throughout our review of results 
and methods from existing research. Towards the end of this work, we apply the theoretical 
framework of attachment theory and incorporate references, where useful, to “adult attachment 
figure representations”, concretely illustrating the boundaries of our framework. We avoid 
appropriating terminology from clinical or developmental domains, whose language is too-often 
conflated with that from other related disciplines. Fourth, we draw exclusively from the body of 
work using blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic neuroimaging (fMRI). 
Most existing research on the neuroscience of human social relationships has used this method to 
gain spatial and temporal information about brain function in response to social stimuli. Within 
this coarse methodological focus, we parse out different results by calling attention to differing 
backgrounds and smaller methodological choices, such as specific fMRI tasks and contrasts used.  
We made these choices to narrow our focus and to avoid confusing concepts or findings from 
traditionally disparate areas of research. 
We conclude by proposing a standardized battery of relationship measures, consistent 
with the tenets of attachment theory. We argue that standardized assessments, including 
measures of attachment status, style, and relationship quality, are necessary to develop 
comprehensive, reliable, and replicable representations of real-world attachment bonds. 
Utility of the Adult Attachment Framework 
 Within the attachment literature—across studies of infants’ primary caregivers and adults’ 
romantic partners—one hallmark of these unique, close social bonds is the feeling of security, 
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and concomitant affect-regulatory benefits, associated with attachment figures’ presence 
(Bowlby, 1973; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Sroufe & Waters, 1977). Bowlby (1973) initially 
theorized that the function of attachment for infants was to support maintenance of proximity 
with a primary caregiver. Lack of perceived proximity and the accompanying distress activates 
this system, whereas comfort and the ability to explore is achieved through this system of 
attachment behavioral dynamics (Bowlby, 1973). These relationships are therefore characterized 
by four behavioral “features”: proximity seeking, separation distress, safe haven, and secure base 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a). Observational studies of young children were the first to 
demonstrate the important role of attachment figures in pacifying separation-related distress 
upon reunion (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Ainsworth’s work paved the way for a research tradition 
of examining individual differences in patterns of behavioral response, observed and noted as 
“attachment styles”. 
 Attachment theory has since been extended to explain certain close, romantic 
relationships in adulthood (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). The overarching adult attachment 
framework serves as a predominant paradigm for understanding the regulatory powers of our 
closest social bonds (Hazan, Gur-Yaish, & Campa, 2004; Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, & 
Powers, 2006) and the long-term psychological and physiological health benefits conferred by 
these relationships (e.g., Beck et al., 2013). However, physical proximity is not always needed 
for felt security; once one has a mental representation of an attachment figure (also known as an 
internal working model), he or she is inherently shaping expectations, behaviors, and utilization 
of this system on that cognitive representation. The so-called “chronic accessibility” of 
attachment figure mental representations (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Baldwin et al., 1996)—by 
which these representations are not just rich and detailed in content but also quick to be recalled 
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and utilized—comes about due to learning and conditioning under this inborn system of 
attachment bonding, operative across the lifespan. 
 Since cognitive representations of attachment figures are thought be chronically 
accessible and relevant for emotion-regulation, they are inherently different in content and 
utilization from representations of others — acquaintances, friends, or even ourselves 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, & Powers, 2006). Mental 
representations of close others in adulthood are composed of highly salient social memories and, 
often, function independent of context. In early development, parents serve as our primary 
attachment figures; in young adulthood and beyond, romantic partners will often serve this role 
(Hazan et al., 1991; Hazan & Zeifman, 1999; Nickerson & Nagle, 2005). Repeated utilization of 
romantic partner mental representations is important for the maintenance of long-term, mutually-
beneficial pair bonds (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a). 
Within the context of pair bonds, romantic partner mental representations have been 
further conceptualized as cognitive expansions of the self (Aron & Aron, 1986). Cognitive 
representations of attachment figures play a role in the pursuit of partner-specific interpersonal 
goals (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003) and in intertwining the cognitive and emotional contexts of 
both relationship partners (Zayas, Shoda, & Ayduk, 2002). Moreover, these representations can 
influence our perceptions of, and responses to, others in our social world through a process 
known as social-cognitive transference (Andersen & Cole, 1990). Experimental studies (e.g., 
Günaydin et al., 2012) demonstrate the occurrence of social-cognitive transference, in which 
internal working models of close others can actually influence how novel social stimuli are 
perceived and encoded. The theory of social-cognitive transference proposes that mental 
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representations of attachment figures strongly influence how we judge others in our social world 
(Andersen & Cole, 1990; Günaydin et al., 2012).  
 Beyond these effects, of great importance are the ramifications of attachment figure 
mental representation utilization in the face of stressors—at the affective, behavioral, neural, and 
cognitive levels. Recent research demonstrates that attachment figure mental representations 
serve various functions contributing to our health and happiness.  Just bringing to mind the 
cognitive representation of one’s romantic partner can promote recovery from recalling upsetting 
autobiographical memories (Selcuk et al., 2012), provide distress alleviation when giving a 
public speech (Grewen et al., 2003), decrease the neural response to threat with partner hand-
holding (Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006), and reduce the subjective experience of pain, even 
above one’s described pain threshold (Eisenberger et al., 2011).  Importantly, we have evidence 
to support the notion that mental representations are not immutable; representations themselves 
can be altered, at the levels of cognition, behavior, and the brain, based on felt security (Collins 
& Feeney, 2004).  
Both theoretical and empirical work support the uniqueness of attachment figure 
representations, especially within the context of romantic relationships. In many cases, the 
presence of intrinsically rewarding contact comfort and sexual activity indicate that romantic 
partnerships are uniquely intimate attachment bonds by nature (Zayas, Merrill, & Hazan, 2015). 
As an attachment bond with a romantic partner forms, this individual becomes integrated into 
one’s cognitive sense of self  (Aron & Aron, 1986) and influences one’s physiological 
homeostatic functions  (Pietromonaco, DeBuse, & Powers, 2013). Biobehavioral synchrony, or 
physiological co-regulation, is often present such pair bonds (for review, see Feldman, 2017).  
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 Because of the powerful role of attachment figure mental representations in forming and 
maintaining close bonds and, more broadly, in assisting individuals with navigation of their 
social environments, it is likely that these representations have unique neural signatures. We 
propose that, by utilizing adult attachment criteria, researchers can implement theoretically-
driven empirical studies and finer-grained corresponding analyses to differentiate our closest of 
social relationships representations in the brain. If we apply adult attachment to derive more 
precise operational definitions of close relationships, we can begin to disentangle the important 
functional regions and networks of the brain we predict to be recruited in such social cognitive 
processing. 
Diverse Findings from fMRI Studies of Close Other Representations 
 Close other neural representations have been approached from two distinct fields of 
thought through use of functional neuroimaging (fMRI) methods. Accordingly, results show 
diversity in the brain regions and networks, or large-scale systems of functionally connected 
brain regions, implicated in creating, updating, and utilizing these mental representations. Social 
neuroscientists focus on motivation and reward conditioning to close others and the affect-
regulatory capabilities close others impart. These investigations consistently implicate the 
recruitment of reward and distress-alleviation systems in the brain (e.g., Acevedo et al., 2012; 
Bartels & Zeki, 2000; Xu et al., 2011). Cognitive neuroscientists, on the other hand, focus on 
characterizing the differential cognitive representations of social others. These studies typically 
investigate how close other representations are created over time through the encoding and 
retrieval of personal information and the accumulation of social memories. This body of work 
examines how the brain supports and updates representations of close social others and relates 
them to representations of the self, repeatedly demonstrating roles for neural systems involved in 
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memory and internally-directed thought  (e.g., Heatherton, et al., 2006, Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 
2010; Wang at al., 2012). The different theoretical and methodological approaches likely result 
in the varied findings across individual studies of close others neural representations. In the 
following section, we review existing findings, highlighting several specific studies that have 
most meaningfully, as evidenced by citations, contributed to our emerging understanding of the 
neural representation of close others. 
Limbic system; Reward pathways and emotion regulation 
Limbic system activity plays a critical role in close other mental representations. The 
mesocorticolimbic and nigrostriatal dopaminergic reward pathways are involved in motivating 
attachment bond formation and maintenance, by way of conditioning to the presence of a 
romantic relationship partner (Fisher, Aron, & Brown, 2005). Attachment figure representations 
become imbued with high reward as positive experiences accumulate with these individuals. 
Behaviorally, this system manifests as a cycle of attachment features; we seek proximity to those 
who provide us with a secure base. Existing social neuroscientific literature provides ample 
support for this facet of close other neural representations, finding recruitment of brain regions 
such as the ventral tegmental area (VTA), ventral and dorsal striatum, mid-insula, caudate head, 
and putamen (Acevedo et al., 2012; Aron et al., 2005; Bartels & Zeki, 2000; Inagaki & 
Eisenberger, 2012; Inagaki et al., 2015; Inagaki et al., 2016; Langeslag et al., 2014; Scheele et al., 
2013; Stoessel et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2012; Zeki & Romaya, 2010).  
The topic of early-stage, pre-attachment romantic relationships attracted social 
neuroscientists once they acquired the tools for BOLD fMRI. Early-stage relationships are 
associated with feelings of euphoria and heightened neurochemical reward (Aron et al., 2005). 
Several of the studies above examine early-stage, intense relationships characterized by feelings 
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of infatuation. In the earliest assessment of the neural basis of romantic love, participants who 
reported being deeply “in love” were instructed to look at photographs of their romantic partners 
and of three different friends while in the fMRI scanner (Bartels & Zeki, 2000). Results showed 
increased activation in medial insula, caudate nucleus, putamen, and anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) when participants looked at their romantic partners’ photos. These neural regions are 
dopamine-rich and are consistently recruited in reward paradigms. This activation pattern was 
investigated in another sample of participants in early-stage, intense romantic relationships, and 
increased activations specific to romantic partners were again found in dopamine-rich areas of 
the brain such as right VTA and medial caudate nucleus (Aron et al., 2005). Individuals “happily 
in love” in early-stage romantic relationships recruit bilateral insula and ACC more often than 
those recently separated from a romantic partner (Stoessel et al., 2011). Study participants from 
an Eastern culture, too, recruit VTA and caudate in representing early-stage romantic partners 
(Xu et al., 2011). Directing attention toward a beloved, early-stage romantic partner versus a 
friend has also been associated with increased ventral striatum activity (Langeslag et al., 2014). 
The past several years have seen a shift in focus reflecting growing interest in the 
neuroscience of attachment; recent studies have examined the role of motivation and reward 
systems in stable, longer-term adult romantic relationships. In 2012, the first and only 
longitudinal study on this topic examined the progression from early-stage passionate love to 
longer-term romantic relationships (Xu et al., 2012). Participants included individuals who, at 
40-month follow-up, were together with their romantic partners from the first assessment and 
others who had since broken up. Results showed that partner-related activity in the tail of the 
caudate during the early-stage assessment was associated with remaining together 40 months 
later, as well as with higher self-reported commitment to the relationship. A second, somewhat 
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counterintuitive set of activational effects also emerged, wherein lower early-stage activity in 
medial orbitofrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens (NAcc) was associated with greater 
commitment, happiness, and longevity of participants’ relationships at 40-month follow-up. The 
directionality of Xu et al.’s (2012) second set of activational effects was brought into question by 
another foundational study of long-term relationship representations. Acevedo and colleagues 
(2012) made an important advance, examining neural representations of long-term romantic 
partners, using a photo-viewing paradigm. They found that individuals who reported high, 
passionate love for a long-term spouse showed significant patterns of neural activation in 
response to partner images versus acquaintance images in the VTA and substantia nigra. 
Furthermore, the authors found that greater closeness—measured by one specific social-
cognitive measure—was related to greater VTA activity in response to partner images versus 
friend images. Relationship length (here, years married) was positively correlated with activation 
of NAcc and caudate in response to romantic partner versus friend. There is also evidence that 
this pattern of findings holds across samples of non-heterosexual individuals in long-term 
romantic relationships (Zeki & Romaya, 2010).  
Other recent research adds breadth to our understanding of the neural reward system’s 
role in representing close others. The neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin also interact with 
dopamine in neural reward processing (Love et al., 2012) and support long-term pair bond 
formation (e.g., Ditzen et al., 2009; Grewen et al., 2005; Schneiderman et al., 2012). The 
behavioral and neural effects on response to long-term romantic partners of manipulating 
individuals’ oxytocin levels have been empirically examined (Scheele et al., 2013). In both a 
discovery and a replication study, either instranasal oxytocin or a placebo was administered to 
heterosexual male participants in long-term romantic relationships. Oxytocin enhanced the 
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positive behavioral bias towards romantic partner photos (measured by ratings of attractiveness 
against objectively matched controls of unfamiliar or familiar others). Further, results showed a 
parallel neural response, as VTA and NAcc were recruited for romantic partners over unfamiliar 
others in the discovery study. In the replication study, familiar other faces were introduced as a 
social control; here, oxytocin similarly enhanced the neural response to partners over familiar 
others in left NAcc and right putamen. 
The regulation of emotion associated with thinking of a close other highlights the role of 
other neural regions within the limbic system, such as ACC and the insula (Beckes, Coan, & 
Hasselmo, 2013; Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Eisenberger et al., 2011; Younger et al., 
2010). Studies assessing affect regulation often utilized threat paradigms, manipulating 
participants’ anticipation or experience of pain while in the scanner. The experience of threat can 
be brought on by a variety of experimental stimuli, such as minor electrical shock, hot or cold 
sensations, uncomfortable pressure applications, or display of anxiety-provoking images or 
words. Yet, the underlying principle of emotion regulation provided by a close other 
representation is common to all of these experiments and to adult attachment theory; in the face 
of stressors, individuals utilize their attachment figure mental representations as safe havens and 
may show separation distress if this comfort is not available. 
Coan, Schaefer, and Davidson conducted their seminal “hand-holding” study in 2006. 
They examined spouse versus stranger hand-holding when participants were faced with 
anticipation of a painful experience in the scanner. The authors found activity in several threat-
responsive regions of interest; they observed that spousal hand-holding (in other words, spouse-
related attenuation of threat) recruited right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left caudate, and NAcc, 
whereas activity in ventral ACC and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) was shown for both 
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spouse- and stranger-related attenuation of threat. Using a similar paradigm, modified to tap 
individuals’ abstract mental representations of non- physically present partners, another 
experiment had female participants view partner versus stranger pictures while receiving painful 
heat stimulations (Eisenberger et al., 2011). Results showed reduced dorsal ACC and anterior 
insula and increased ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activation in the partner-picture 
condition. Additionally, increased vmPFC activity in response to partner photographs was 
associated with higher perceived support from the partner, longer relationship lengths, reduced 
subjective ratings of pain, and decreased activity in pain-related neural regions such as ACC and 
insula. These findings lend support to the safe-haven role of attachment figure neural 
representations. Attachment figures often serve as safe havens, or responsive people that 
individuals turn to for comfort in times of distress; the research described above explains the 
coupling of behavioral responses to attachment figure support with neural reduction of threat and 
pain. 
Several other studies have considered the reversal of roles in affect regulation, 
investigating how our brains manage perceptions of threat to close others (versus to ourselves). 
Incorporating elements of emotion regulation research and cognitive neuroscientific methods, 
one study applied a mild electric shock paradigm to look at self-focused threat, versus close 
friend-focused threat or stranger-focused threat (Beckes, Coan, & Hasselmo, 2013). Significant 
conjunctions between the threat-to-self and threat-to-friend conditions were observed in anterior 
insula, putamen, and supramarginal gyrus. Studies on the process of giving and receiving 
emotional support to close relationship partners also exemplify the significant emotion-
regulatory capacities of attachment figure representations. A series of studies examining support-
giving, support-receiving, and even feelings of loneliness further demonstrated the unique 
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response of the ventral striatum to representations of long-term-romantic partners (Inagaki & 
Eisenberger, 2012; Inagaki et al., 2015; Inagaki et al., 2016). Taken together, this social 
neuroscientific research on close other neural representations closely aligns with the tenets of 
adult attachment theory, moving the field towards an empirically-supported neuroscience of 
attachment. 
Mirror neuron system; Resonance with another’s thoughts and feelings 
A smaller group of neuroscientists have asserted the potential role of the mirror neuron 
system (MNS) in representing close others (Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli, 2008; Petrican, 
Rosenbaum, & Grady, 2015). The MNS—in particular, a collection of neurons within premotor 
cortex—is thought to play an important role in the ability to understand others’ actions, both in 
humans and other primates (for review, see Ortigue, 2010 and Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
One context in which the role of the MNS has been assessed was that of neural responsiveness to 
a spouse’s incongruent emotions; presumably, our closest relationships might be characterized 
by sensitivity to when a partner’s feelings may be incongruous with one’s own. One recent study 
examined older adult female participants in long-term marriages, asking them to make trait 
judgments about either their spouse’s or a stranger’s affect in the presence of incongruent verbal 
and non-verbal cues (Petrican, Rosenbaum, & Grady, 2015). Greater activity in putative MNS 
areas, such as the inferior parietal lobules, was associated only with processing a spouse’s, but 
not a stranger’s, non-verbal cues when the target’s behavior was positive while in a negative 
(incongruous) context. Although this line of research shows promise for our growing 
understanding of the complex role played by the MNS in relating to a close other, there are 
remaining questions about the interaction of this system with others, such as the default network. 
Default network; Mentalization for self and others 
  21 
Cognitive neuroscientists have consistently found activation within a collection of 
functionally-connected brain regions known as the default network to be associated with social-
other mental representations. Core brain areas within the canonical default network include the 
medial temporal lobes, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), PCC, lateral prefrontal cortex, lateral 
temporal cortices, and lateral parietal cortices (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 
2009). Default network activity is thought to support many aspects of social cognition. As social 
beings, we use our own experiences to generate social conceptual knowledge which, in turn, 
allows us to develop and implement strategic social behaviors reliant on default network function 
(Spreng & Mar, 2012). For example, the integrity of vmPFC predicts the ability to retrieve 
impressions of others (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2012), and attributional decisions and judgments of 
others’ emotional states recruit vmPFC (Haas, Anderson, & Filkowski, 2015). The default 
network also enables us to imagine the experiences of others.  In one study, participants were 
taught the personalities (based on two dimensions of agreeableness and extraversion) of four 
characters (Hassabis et al., 2014). They then imagined those characters’ behaviors across 
different situations. Results showed that activity in the mPFC reliably predicted which characters 
the participants were imagining. This body of literature has effectively set the stage for 
cognitive-neuroscientific investigations of specific social dynamics and unique, close social 
relationships 
 In studies specific to close other neural representations, regions of interest within the 
default network include the mPFC and PCC (Gobbini et al., 2004; Heatherton et al. 2006; 
Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji 
2006; Tacikowski et al. 2011, 2013; Wang et al., 2012). Early work conceptualized social 
proximity as a function of one of two factors: familiarity or similarity. Participants in the earliest 
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of these studies viewed faces of personally familiar people (relatives and friends), familiar 
famous individuals (such as public leaders or actors), and strangers (Gobbini et al., 2004). 
Viewing personally familiar faces—contrasted against both famous familiar faces and 
strangers—was associated with a pattern of neural response in bilateral PCC and precuneus. The 
authors interpreted their results as evidence for close-other “person knowledge” in the brain, 
supporting past findings implicating these regions in processes such as theory-of-mind- for well-
known others. MPFC activity also assisted in differentiating similar-other representations from 
dissimilar-other representations during a trait-judgement task (Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji, 
2006). More specifically, ventral mPFC was recruited here for self-referential and similar other 
related thought, whereas more dorsal mPFC regions were active for thought regarding dissimilar 
others. This finding prompted interest in determining how default network activity supports a 
kind of “simulation” of the internal mental states of others and how it might selectivity do so for 
socially proximate others. 
Within the literature on mentalizing (or, imagining the thoughts or feelings of others), a 
few studies have initiated a focus on the role of mPFC and PCC in differentiating close other 
from stranger or from self representations. Some have asserted that the representation of self is 
“special”, uniquely recruiting mPFC in contrast to representations of intimately known others 
(e.g., Heatherton et al., 2006). In 2010, Krienen, Tu, and Buckner advanced this earlier work. 
Participants in their study made judgments about personal preferences in response to facial 
images of close friends versus strangers. They found, for the first time, that friends versus 
strangers yielded a network of brain regions including mPFC, PCC/ retrosplenial cortex, inferior 
parietal lobe, lateral temporal cortex, and medial temporal lobe (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). 
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In the years since this study, further research has provided more nuance to understanding 
the role of the default network in representing close others. These findings have been extended to 
collectivistic cultures; thinking of certain close others such as mothers or the self (even over best 
friends or fathers) in a trait judgment task yielded higher mPFC and ACC activity (Wang et al., 
2012). A similar pattern of results has also been found using a target name-viewing paradigm 
(Tacikowski et al., 2011) and in extending this paradigm across the modalities of viewing and 
listening to names (Tacikowki et al., 2013). 
Considering the rapidly growing evidence for the default network’s role in representing 
close others, we were interested in how this network, as well as other brain regions and networks, 
may respond to relationships of differential closeness. More specifically, we wanted to learn how 
the brain might differentially represent those individuals who serve as our primary attachment 
figures. To begin answering these questions, we recently explored the neural representation of 
known others along a continuum of attachment using fMRI (Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017).  
In this experiment, heterosexual adults in romantic relationships for over two years were asked to 
make trait judgments for a romantic partner, parent, close friend, familiar acquaintance, and self 
during an fMRI scan. Across all social-other and the self conditions, in contrast to a motor 
control condition, trait judgments engaged the default network and lateral prefrontal cortex. 
Judgments about oneself and attached romantic partner additionally recruited anterior and middle 
cingulate cortex and anterior insula, relative to parent and close friend. These results provided 
novel evidence that mentalizing about primary attachment figures—here, romantic partners—
engages the default and salience networks. Salience network regions such as anterior cingulate 
and anterior insula detect internal and external events that are personally meaningful and interact 
with the default network to represent internal events (Christoff et al., 2016; Uddin et al., 2015). 
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The results of our study showed this interaction by way of the unique patterns of neural response 
to attached romantic partners and to the self. We concluded that, while the default network is 
recruited for construction and utilization of social representations, the salience network 
selectively attunes us to the most meaningful of these representations—those of primary 
attachment figures.  
Our approach has several innovations for work on known others. First, our experimental 
stimuli included the names of real individuals who were highly-relevant to each participant. 
Second, unlike past studies utilizing passive fMRI tasks (such as free-viewing photos of known 
others), our paradigm required that participants actively mentalize about each of the social 
targets. Third, we included numerous self-report measures in an attempt to better describe and 
characterize participants’ relationships with their social targets; one such measure, for example, 
provided us with information about who participants’ (primary) attachment figures were. We 
were able to provide initial evidence that the representation of adult attachment is a 
distinguishing feature of the neural activation differences in social cognition. 
Cortical and subcortical interactions support representation of close others 
If one overarching conclusion emerges from fMRI studies of close other representations, 
it is that we are now arriving at a novel, cross-disciplinary neuroscience of close relationships—
yet from several very different perspectives. Just as our mental representations of close others 
reflect the complexity of rich person-knowledge, emotionally salient memories, and unique 
regulatory capabilities, the neural regions and networks responsible for carrying close other 
representations are complex, as well. Bringing together past findings, these neural regions and 
networks appear to include: dopamine-rich regions sensitive to partner reward such as VTA, 
NAcc, and putamen; threat-responsive regions sensitive to partner comfort such as ACC and 
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insula; mirror neuron regions sensitive to a partner’s inner states such as inferior parietal lobules; 
default network regions sensitive to mentalizing about a partner such as mPFC and PCC; and 
salience network regions sensitive to meaningful cues associated with a partner such as anterior 
insula and anterior cingulate.  
Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. Integrated model of the neural regions and networks recruited in representing 
attachment figures 
This integrative model (Figure 2.1) is supported not only by the individual contributions 
of each of the task-based fMRI studies discussed in this section but also by recent resting state 
functional connectivity analyses of “in love” participants (Song et al., 2015). Being deeply “in 
love” may be associated with changes in the functional architecture of the brain, specifically 
measured by increased functional connectivity within a network of regions important for reward, 
motivation, and emotion regulation (including the dorsal ACC, caudate, NAcc, and insula) and, 
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separately, within another network of “social cognition” regions resembling the canonical default 
network (including the PCC, mPFC, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction, and inferior parietal 
lobe) (Song et al., 2015). Our synthesis shows the interplay between cortical and subcortical 
regions of the brain, all necessary and each playing different roles to support distinct facets of 
our complex representations of close others.  To be able to draw meaningful conclusions from 
these findings, however, it is important to refer back to their methodological discrepancies. 
Methodological Differences Characterize Existing Research 
 In the next section of this review, we employ a different approach towards integrating 
this literature. Here, we look across recent fMRI studies of close other mental representations 
with respect to their methods. Of particular interest to us are experimental parameters reflecting 
how researchers measure “closeness” when studying neural responses to social cognitive stimuli. 
Here, we discuss the: usage of terminology relating to close relationships; collection of 
relationship length data; self-report measures of closeness with relationship partners; social 
cognitive tasks used in the MRI scanner; and specific condition contrasts used in blood oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) fMRI data analysis. We also track sample sizes, as well as gender, 
sexual orientation, and age composition of these studies’ samples. 
Terminology 
Even a cursory glance at the terminology used by existing studies provides some 
rationale for their diverse findings. Authors use varied, but specific, language to operationally 
define their constructs of interest. They often continue to use this language in reporting and 
promoting research findings in their articles. Of the studies we surveyed, a majority describe 
their construct of interest as “romantic love” (e.g., Acevedo et al., 2012; Aron et al., 2005; 
Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2011; Langeslag et al., 2014). Other studies focus on “close others” or 
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“close relationships” (e.g., Heatherton et al., 2006; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010), “familiar 
others” (e.g., Beckes, Coan, & Hasselmo, 2013), “attachment figures” (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 
2011; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017), or “significant others” (e.g., Tacikowski et al., 2011). 
These discrepancies in terminology preclude meaningful integration of findings across concepts 
and fields. With various studies employing vastly different—and, at times, ambiguous—
terminology, we cannot assume that these studies assess one consistent construct of close other 
neural representations.  
Relationship length 
Relationship length is an essential descriptive statistic in such investigations. A social 
relationship is comprised of countless salient memories amassed over its course – whether that is 
a few weeks or numerous years. We assume that close other neural representations would not be 
identical across differing relationship timepoints. Relationship length is also meaningfully 
related to the measurement of attachment; while infatuation peaks within the first year of a 
romantic relationship, behavioral features (e.g. safe haven and secure base) indicating that a full-
fledged attachment bond has formed may not be completely present until two years or more into 
the relationship (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Accurately portraying relationship length plays a 
critical role in informing the relationship between behavioral shifts over the timecourse of a 
relationship and neural representation changes. 
Yet, the existing literature reveals a lack of reported relationship length data. Half of the 
studies reviewed do not report any relationship length descriptive statistics for the target close 
relationships. For those who do report this variable, average (arithmetic mean) length of 
relationships with target relationship partner range from a few months (Langeslag et al., 2014, <9 
months; Stoessel et al., 2011, <6 months; Younger et al., 2010, <9 months) to many years 
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(Acevedo et al., 2012, 21 years; Petrican, Rosenbaum, & Grady, 2015, 40.17 years). Several 
studies list a minimum or maximum relationship length as participation criteria but do not report 
average relationship lengths. Still more studies do provide descriptive statistics of their samples’ 
relationship duration. Lastly, the terminology used to describe relationship length often does not 
capture the nuances inherent to this variable. For example, not all authors distinguished between 
how long ago participants may have starting dating or married versus first met their current 
relationship partners. Although longitudinal research that compares neural activation patterns at 
different relationship timepoints is minimal, the existing work does show notable trends in the 
recruitment of neural regions and networks related to relationship length (Xu et al., 2011; Xu et 
al., 2012). Current fMRI research does not recruit or report on a wide-enough range of 
participant relationship lengths to capture a full understanding of how this variable relates to 
other neural and behavioral outcome variables.  
Self-report measures of “closeness” 
Relationship length data alone, while important to characterize the expected relationship 
status represented by a sample of participants, is not sufficient to characterize an individual’s 
feelings of closeness or attachment with his or her partner. It is necessary to include self-report 
measures to capture participants’ emotions and thoughts regarding their relationships. Collecting 
these data helps provide an accurate sense of what participants’ social neural representations may 
indicate. Just under half of the studies we reviewed do not describe any specific self-report 
measures used to assess relationship closeness or quality. Most who have administered self-
report closeness measures rely heavily on the Passionate Love Scale (PLS) (Hatfield & Sprecher, 
1986). Many studies that include a relationship closeness self-report measure administered only 
the PLS. The PLS assesses cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components of passionate love. 
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The Likert-type items on this scale probe for partner preoccupation, idealization, physical 
attraction, and desire (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986). The PLS is not an ideal proxy for relationship 
closeness, as it focuses entirely on participants’ feelings of infatuation or passionate love. In fact, 
PLS items more closely represent the documented “symptoms” of infatuation (Tennov, 1979) 
than a durable pair bond. Additionally, asking participants to complete only the PLS about their 
romantic partner could lead to priming neural responses with cues of high reward and approach 
motivation. 
A few studies (e.g., Acevedo et al., 2012; Beckes, Coan, & Hasselmo, 2013; Laurita, 
Hazan, & Spreng, 2017) utilize the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992). The IOS is a single-item pictorial measure of closeness and interconnectedness 
in dyads. The seven instances of two overlapping circles of the IOS range from mutually 
exclusive to highly overlapping in appearance (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The IOS is a 
direct self-report measure of perceived closeness with relationship partners, as it is a visual 
representation of how individuals think of their partners and themselves. Yet, there is little space 
for objective clarification of responses to the IOS. It is possible to view the highly overlapping 
circles as a negative, enmeshed state not representative of an ideal close relationship. 
 One study (Acevedo et al., 2012), utilizes the PLS, the IOS, the Eros subscale of the Love 
Attitudes Scale (LAS) (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986), and the Friendship-Based Love Scale 
(FBLS) (Grote & Frieze, 1994). The FBLS is intended to measure comfortable, affectionate, 
trusting love for a likable partner, based on a deep sense of friendship. The FBLS is a nine-item 
Likert-type measure (Grote & Frieze, 1994). While the FBLS is a well-suited complement to the 
PLS, it does not measure all the components of closeness on its own. The Eros subscale of the 
LAS assesses levels of passionate love—initial attraction and perceived “chemistry” for 
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instance—in one’s relationship with a romantic partner (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986). In our 
own recent study (Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017), we took a similar approach to Acevedo and 
colleagues (2012) in collecting self-report data, as we administered a comprehensive relationship 
battery (see Appendix 2.A). 
Many studies implement other measures related to relationship closeness or to different 
relationship quality factors such as satisfaction. Of the studies that do administer other self-report 
closeness measures, only a few report the resulting behavioral data (e.g., Beckes, Coan, & 
Hasselmo, 2013; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017) or utilize participants’ responses as variables 
in their neuroimaging analyses (e.g., Acevedo et al., 2012). The inconsistencies in usage of self-
report closeness measures restrict our ability to make conclusive statements about close other 
representations in the brain. Collectively, we have not defined what is meant by “close” with 
respect to social relationship representations. 
Social cognitive tasks used in the MRI scanner 
There was also great variety seen in the tasks used to evoke neural representations of 
close others. Most of the studies we examined implement an experimental paradigm in which 
participants view facial images of their target relationship partner(s) versus control images (e.g., 
Acevedo, 2012; Inagaki et al., 2016; Scheele et al., 2013; Zeki & Romaya, 2010). Within this 
category, there are several variations on the social cognitive task used, including unpleasant heat 
stimulations paired with the various facial images (Eisenberger et al., 2011), one-back repetition 
tests (Gobbini et al., 2004), and oddball tasks with photos as targets or distractors (Langeslag et 
al., 2014). Beyond facial image viewing, other tasks include trait judgment of partner versus 
others (Heatherton et al., 2006; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017; 
Wang et al., 2012), and support giving or receiving from partner versus others (Coan, Schaefer, 
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& Davidson, 2006; Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2011). One study used the administration of oxytocin 
to participants as an independent variable in their experiment (Scheele et al., 2013). Another 
recent study does not include a specific social cognitive task but instead looks at how romantic 
love may be associated with neural functional architecture, by assessing functional connectivity 
in a resting state scan for “in love” participants (Song et al., 2015).  
It is probable that the diverse social cognitive tasks we choose lead to distinct patterns of 
activation in the brain. For instance, we would expect to see different findings in response to a 
partner trait-judgement task (e.g. Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010) versus a partner hand-holding 
experimental paradigm (Beckes, Coan, & Hasselmo, 2013). Although these tasks may be 
assessing the same construct of cognitive representations of close relationships, the relevant 
representations are likely activated for distinct motivational purposes across the studies 
mentioned above. 
Specific condition contrasts used in BOLD fMRI data analysis 
Each of the studies in the above section includes control conditions for activation 
contrasts within their BOLD fMRI data. Most studies use exclusively social contrast conditions 
such as a less-close friend, a highly familiar other, an acquaintance, a known famous figure, or a 
complete stranger. Others include non-social controls—such as the categorization of a 
typographical font (Wang et al., 2012). When studying social closeness, it is crucial to control 
for as many other interpersonal factors as possible. For instance, including conditions for a 
familiar but non-close other or a friend known for an equal amount of years as a romantic partner 
would allow for better isolation of the social closeness variable.  
Scheele and colleagues (2013) demonstrate the importance of including a variety of 
social contrasts, introducing famous-other and then familiar-other faces as a specific controls to 
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romantic partners faces in their discovery and replication studies, respectively. This 
methodological choice allowed them to interpret their activational results as specific to close 
others—not simply familiar others. In our aforementioned study (Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 
2017), we also examine close other representations using several relevant social condition 
contrasts. By including a variety of social contrast conditions in our study, we were able to 
isolate patterns of neural activity specific to primary attachment figure representations. However, 
it is increasingly clear that few neuroimaging studies have systematically assessed the continuum 
of personal relatedness and attachment in this way. 
Size and demographic composition of samples 
Samples range from 10 (Gobbini et al., 2004) to 98 (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010) 
subjects scanned. Several studies only scanned heterosexual females as part of partner-pairs (e.g., 
Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Petrican, Rosenbaum, & Grady, 2015), and one study 
included only heterosexual males in romantic relationships (Scheele et al., 2013). Most studies 
include primarily college-aged, young adults, with only a few examining older adults (Acevedo 
et al., 2012; Petrican, Rosenbaum, & Grady, 2015). These inconsistencies and shortcomings in 
study demographics further cloud our understanding of neural representations of close others. It 
is clear that we need to direct attention and resources towards studying men, non-exclusively-
heterosexual individuals, and older adults. The close relationships literature is rife with gender 
differences, and there is substantial reason to believe that neural representations of close others 
may be different across genders (e.g., Burleson, 2003; Diamond, 2003; Hendrick & Hendrick, 
1995). Most of the existing literature on sex differences focuses on differences in attachment 
styles. For example, Del Guidice conducted a meta-analysis in 2011, finding that males show 
higher avoidance and lower anxiety in attachment than do females. Zeki and Romaya (2010) 
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found no gender or sexual orientation differences in brain activation. Yet, undiscovered 
differences could certainly exist 
Recommendations, and a Proposal for a Standardized Assessment Battery 
Although we are far from achieving the goal of cohesive integration of cognitive and 
social theories of relationships, we can progress toward consistent utilization of theoretically- 
and empirically- based methodological procedures and increased awareness of attachment 
theory’s applications. Here, we offer a series of recommendations (see Table 2.1) designed to 
promote an interdisciplinary approach for mapping the neural representation of our closest 
relationships, conceptualized as attachment bonds:  
1) Increased awareness of attachment theory as a guiding framework through cross-
disciplinary collaborations 
In this review, we discuss the applicability of adult attachment theory to the study of 
neural representations of close others. Since attachment bonds in adulthood are quantifiable and 
their associated behaviors, emotions, and cognitions are already well-studied, we believe this to 
be a fruitful approach to categorizing our closest social relationships. Only once relationships are 
adequately described and categorized can we expect to find reliable patterns of neural activity 
that reliably underlie their representations.  
Until recent years, there has been only minimal evidence of cross-talk between social-
psychological theorists and social-cognitive neuroscientists regarding the study of close 
relationship representations. Despite significant overlap in researchers’ topics and populations of 
interest, few examples of collaborative projects exist, to date (e.g., Acevedo et al., 2012; 
Eisenberger et al., 2011; Laurita, Hazan, & Spreng, 2017). As part of this recommendation, we 
hope to promote cross-disciplinary collaborations that bring together experts from these fields. 
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We believe that such partnerships would enable the effective application of attachment theory 
and would yield clearer neuroimaging results. 
2) More focused participant recruitment to capture the full spectrum of social relationships 
In human subjects research, it is often difficult to fully control for pre-existing 
characteristics that may be related to study outcomes. Yet, it is necessary that we do what we can 
to improve construct validity and reliability. We should recognize the connection between 
accurate self-report of data describing participants’ close relationships and how we eventually 
characterize a representative sample. One way to move towards greater consistency within a 
sample and generalizability to other samples would be to include relationship criteria as part of 
more focused recruitment strategies. For example, researchers could recruit participants who 
maintain attachment relationships with a romantic partner and/or a parent (according to self-
report and/or relationship length data). 
3) Design of neuroimaging tasks that directly capture how participants behaviorally utilize 
attachment figure mental representations 
A study’s motivations are inherently connected to its results through the careful design of 
its experimental paradigm. As evidenced by the variety of fMRI tasks we cover in the present 
review, there is space for both replications and constructions of different tasks in future research. 
We argue that the design of neuroimaging tasks can be better-informed by understanding the 
affective, behavioral, and cognitive processes involved in representing close others. We 
recommend that researchers explore different types of tasks that require active mentalization 
about or utilization of attachment figure representations. Passive tasks will not require 
participants to draw upon their attachment figure representations in replicable or consistent ways. 
Examples of active mentalization tasks include, but are not limited to, trait judgement, or social 
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autobiographical memory, accompanied by target name or photograph prompts that are 
individualized for each participant. Other rigorous designs that would require utilization of 
attachment figure representations include real or simulated presence of attachment figures in 
threat-induction paradigms (e.g., hand-holding task). 
4) Necessary inclusion of social controls in neuroimaging tasks 
We believe this point is important enough to be a separate recommendation; it is 
challenging to draw conclusions about any close other neural representations if social contrasts 
are not intentionally included. Implications of task-based fMRI findings rely on our ability to 
compare patterns of activation across different conditions. We recommend that all studies of 
close other representations include targets such as romantic partners, family members, close 
friends, acquaintances, famous figures, strangers, and the self as control conditions that are social 
in nature and possess ecological validity. Within the broad social category of known others, there 
may be substantial differences along the dimensions of closeness and familiarity. To parse out 
behavioral and neural differences between several known others, studies could require 
participants to think of specific exemplars of each of these dimensions: an attached romantic 
partner or family member, a friend with whom the participant is close and familiar but not 
attached, a familiar but not close acquaintance, and a known but not close or familiar famous 
figure. Ideally, future fMRI studies will capture patterns of brain activity for more complete 
spectra of familiarity and closeness. 
5) Implementation of rigorous methodological practices needed for statistical power in 
neuroimaging studies, including larger sample size and proper reporting of brain and 
behavioral data 
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Increased interest in neural correlates of social psychological constructs must go hand-in-
hand with adherence to rigorous methodological practices needed for neuroimaging studies (for 
review, see Button et al., 2013; Mar, Spreng, & DeYoung, 2013; Poldrack et al., 2017; Yarkoni, 
2009). It is not reasonable to interpret individual differences in a sample of thirty fMRI 
participants or to draw any conclusions from a sample of ten; such investigations can actively 
muddle this emerging field of close relationship neuroscience. Likewise, minimal inclusion of 
behavioral data reflects an inadequate understanding of the overlap between psychology and 
neuroscience in understanding close relationships. Both brain data and behavioral data should be 
collected and reported in accordance with the highest standards of both disciplines. 
6) Utilization of a standardized battery of self-report measures 
Importantly, we need to administer self-report measures that answer numerous questions 
about participants’ cognitions, behaviors, and emotions within the context of their relationships. 
Some of the questions we would certainly want future participants to answer include: To whom 
are participants attached? How do participants view their social closeness with specific others?  
Toward whom do participants feel passionate love? Toward whom do participants feel 
companionate love?  What attachment style do participants show in their current romantic 
relationships? How committed, satisfied, and invested do participants feel in their current 
romantic relationships? How long have participants been in relationships with their romantic 
partners? How long have participants known specific other people?  
Answers to these questions could let us know, on a basic level, the core drivers of  
regional and network brain activation differences. If we implement a standard battery of 
measures addressing these and other questions across studies, we can begin to tap into a unified 
cognitive construct of attachment figure mental representations. Such a standard battery can 
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provide a clear picture of the content of attachment figure mental representations, the attachment 
“status” and style, and the specific ways in which attachment figure representations are different 
from other social representations. 
Our proposed standard battery can be found in Appendix 2.A. This compilation of close 
relationship self-report measures includes the WHOTO (Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 
1991), IOS (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), PLS (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986), FBLS (Grote & 
Frieze, 1994), ECR-R-PS (Fraley, Waller, and Brennan, 2000), and brief partner-specific and 
general relationship questionnaires of our own design. Each measure serves a specific purpose in 
providing clear, attachment-related information about an adult’s close relationships. The 
WHOTO (Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 1991) is an attachment functions measure that 
determines the people with whom subjects display attachment relationships. The items are based 
on four attachment-related components: proximity seeking, separation distress, safe haven, and 
secure.  Subjects list up to four most important figures in their lives by generic labels (e.g. 
“mother”, “husband”) for each of the ten items. The Partner-Specific Experiences in Close 
Relationships Scale (ECR-R-PS) (Fraley, Waller, and Brennan, 2000), is a measure designed to 
assess individual differences with respect to attachment-related anxiety and avoidance. This 
partner-specific version assesses these differences within the context of subjects’ current 
romantic relationships. Responses to ten items are on a seven-point Likert scale.  
 Lastly, we include brief questionnaires in order to gain consistent self-report data about 
variables such as relationship length. The partner specific items assess commitment, exclusivity, 
and satisfaction, whereas the general questions gauge depth of personal knowledge and 
emotional investment in any kind of relationship. By including each of these measures, in 
addition to the highly relevant IOS (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) and complementary PLS 
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(Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986) and FBLS (Grote & Frieze, 1994), we account for whom 
participants feel the closest to and what their attachment status is. Completion of this battery 
provides extensive information about participants’ potential attachments to romantic partners, in 
particular. 
Concluding Remarks 
Various regions of the brain, including those important for reward, emotional regulation, 
memory, and understanding of others’ actions, are recruited in the activation of mental 
representations of attachment figures. The neural systems involved in the formation and function 
of mental representations in adult attachment relationships are understandably complex. In the 
present work, we call attention to an emerging field of close relationship neuroscience and a gap 
in its literature that would benefit greatly from increasing collaborations across disciplines.  
We have asserted that the developing social neuroscience of attachment is based in a rich 
theoretical framework. Attachment theory suggests that behavior towards certain close others 
differs fundamentally from behavior towards more distant others. One important characteristic of 
attachment bonds is the feeling of security associated with attachment figures’ proximity. As 
individuals undergo conditioning processes over the course of relationship development, the 
accessibility of attachment figure mental representations supplants the need for physical 
proximity. Social cognitive neuroimaging studies implicate a wide array of brain systems in 
supporting attachment figure representations. Engagement of reward systems, as well as the 
distress-alleviation mechanism within the limbic system, have been implicated in attachment 
formation and maintenance. Past work also highlights the role of the limbic system in emotional 
regulation provided by a close other.  Memory systems support the encoding and retrieval of 
person-specific knowledge and social memories necessary to form rich cognitive representations. 
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The default network has also been implicated in differentiating mental representations of oneself 
and of known others. Lastly, the salience network demonstrates a critical ability to distinguish 
primary attachment figure representations from other social representations. Past studies have, 
however, applied diverse approaches to operationalize and measure the constructs of close 
relationship representations or attachment figure representations. 
In light of the excitement and confusion surrounding this new area of research, we have 
offered a series of recommendations designed to promote an interdisciplinary approach for 
mapping the neural basis of attachment figure representations. We assert that administration of 
standardized assessments, including measures of attachment status, style and relationship quality, 
is necessary to develop comprehensive, reliable and replicable markers of real-world attachment 
representations. In addition to uniting the contributing neuroimaging fields, future research could 
include implementation of longitudinal designs investigating which neural structures are 
sensitive to the affective, behavioral, cognitive, and physiological processes involved in 
attachment figure mental representations. In the future, it could be possible to learn how neural 
representations of primary attachment figures within a romantic couple or a parent/adult child 
relationship change over the course of a lifetime spent together. We might also be able to 
examine what kinds of interpersonal experiences, specifically, recruit neural regions of interest 
within the context of close other mental representations. We already have evidence for how 
crucial attachment bonds are for our psychological and physical health throughout the life 
course; with cross-disciplinary communication and sharing of methodological tools, the 
possibilities to learn more about the brain’s function in these powerful relationships are limitless. 
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Table 2.1. Recommendations to Promote an Interdisciplinary Approach to Close Relationship 
Neuroscience 
Our Recommendation 
 
One Example of Implementation 
1. Increased awareness of attachment theory as a 
guiding framework through cross-disciplinary 
collaborations 
 
Initiate research partnership between 
social psychologist and cognitive 
neuroscientist 
2. More focused participant recruitment to capture 
the full spectrum of social relationships 
 
 
Recruit participants who, based on self-
report data, maintain attachment 
relationships with a romantic partner 
and/or a parent 
3. Design of neuroimaging tasks that directly capture 
how participants behaviorally utilize attachment 
figure mental representations 
 
Utilize a social-cognitive task that 
requires active mentalization, such as 
trait judgment 
4. Necessary inclusion of social controls in 
neuroimaging tasks 
 
 
Include targets of romantic partners, 
family members, close friends, 
acquaintances, famous figures, strangers, 
and self as control conditions 
5. Implementation of rigorous methodological 
practices needed for statistical power in 
neuroimaging studies, including larger sample size 
and proper reporting of brain and behavioral data 
Collect and report descriptive statistics 
for all self-report data pertaining to 
relationships 
  
6. Utilization of a standardized battery of self-report 
measures 
 
 
Include measures found in Appendix 2.A 
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CHAPTER 3 
Dissociable patterns of brain activity for mentalizing about known others: A role for 
attachment 
 We continually update our representations of other individuals and utilize those 
representations, especially about persons with whom we form attachment relationships, to guide 
social behaviors. The hallmarks of these unique, close social bonds are feelings of security and 
concomitant affect-regulatory benefits associated with attachment figures’ presence (Bowlby, 
1982; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Sroufe & Waters, 1977). In infant development, attachment 
is theorized to play a pivotal role in maintaining proximity to the primary caregiver (Bowlby et 
al., 1982). Lack of perceived proximity, and accompanying distress, engages attachment 
representations. These attachment representations in turn provide comfort and security, 
facilitating exploration, in a constantly shifting system of behavioral dynamics. The extension of 
this theoretical framework, to explain adult romantic relationships (Hazan & Shaver, 1987), 
currently serves as a predominant paradigm for understanding the regulatory powers of close 
social bonds (Hazan, Gur-Yaish, & Campa, 2004; Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, & Powers, 
2006). The so-called “chronic accessibility” (Andersen, et al. 1990; Baldwin et al., 1993) of 
attachment figure mental representations comes about due to learning and conditioning under 
this inborn system of attachment bonding that is operative across the lifespan. 
Recent research demonstrates that attachment figure mental representations serve various 
functions contributing to health and happiness.  Just bringing to mind the cognitive 
representation of one’s romantic partner, for example, promotes recovery following recollection 
of upsetting autobiographical memories (Selcuk, et al., 2012), provides distress alleviation when 
giving a public speech (Grewen, et al., 2003), decreases the neural response to threat with partner 
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hand-holding (Coan, et al. 2006), and reduces the subjective experience of pain (Eisenberger et 
al., 2011).  Importantly, evidence supports the notion that these mental representations are 
flexible; shifts in cognition, behavior, and patterns of neural activation can be associated with 
changes in attachment. 
 Recent neuroimaging results show the involvement of many brain regions, and associated 
brain networks, in creating, updating, and using mental representations of close others. Several 
studies highlight the role of the dopaminergic reward system, particularly of areas such as the 
mid-insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), caudate head, ventral tegmental area (VTA), and 
putamen, in motivating pair bond formation and maintenance and in the regulation of emotion 
associated with thinking of a close other (Acevedo et al., 2012; Bartels & Zeki, 2000; Stoessel et 
al., 2011; Younger et al., 2010; Zeki & Romaya, 2010; see Feldman, 2016 for review). Research 
utilizing threat-anticipation tasks also links the emotion-regulatory capabilities of close other 
mental representations with various limbic system regions (Coan, Schafer and Davidson, 2006). 
 Others associate activation of regions within the default network, a functionally-
connected assembly of brain regions broadly implicated in internally-directed cognition, with 
mental representation of social others. Core brain areas within the default network include 
medial and lateral temporal lobes, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC), and lateral parietal cortices (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood & Spreng, 2014). The default 
network is associated with several aspects of social cognition, including mentalizing (or, making 
inferences about other people’s mental states) (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Personal 
experiences are thought to be an important mechanism in the generation of social conceptual 
knowledge which, in turn, leads to development and implementation of strategic social behavior 
(Spreng and Mar, 2012).  
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Neuroimaging research commonly uses trait-judgment paradigms to assess cognition 
related to social others. Early work by Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji (2006) demonstrated the 
role of the mPFC in differentiating similar versus dissimilar other representations. With respect 
to studies of close-other cognitive representations, neural regions of interest include the mPFC 
and PCC  (e.g., Gobbini et al., 2004; Heatherton et al., 2006; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; 
Platek et al., 2006; Tacikowski et al. 2012, 2013; Wang, et al., 2012). Within the literature on 
mentalizing, studies focus on the role of the default network in differentiating close others from 
strangers or self. Personal judgments about friends, over and above those about strangers, engage 
a network of brain regions in mPFC, PCC/retrosplenial cortex, inferior parietal lobe, lateral 
temporal cortex, and medial temporal lobe (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). Recruitment of these 
regions for friend judgments suggests that the default network plays a role in formation or access 
of representations of known others.  Further, representations of the self are associated with 
greater engagement of mPFC, over and above representations of intimately known others 
(Heatherton et al., 2006), suggesting that social proximity or attachment modulates engagement 
of this region, and the default network more broadly. However, no single study investigates the 
full spectrum of social proximity. 
Here we use fMRI to examine the neural representation of known others along a 
continuum of attachment. We use a trait-judgment task, requiring participants to make personal 
judgments about a romantic partner, parent, close friend, familiar acquaintance, and the self. Our 
goal was to determine how mental representations of salient attachment figures and others in our 
social world are associated with patterns of brain activity, and whether these patterns are 
modulated by the presence of a primary attachment bond. We predicted that, overall, trait 
judgments about all known people and the self, relative to a matched control condition, would 
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engage mPFC and PCC. This hypothesis is consistent with literature investigating mentalizing 
and the default network (Mar, 2011; Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood & Spreng, 2014). We also 
predicted that neural representations of self and attached romantic partners would be 
differentiable from representations of parents and friends. Strong evidence exists for the 
differential behavioral, physiological, cognitive, and emotional responses to attachment 
figures—and, particularly, primary attachment figures—versus less close others (Hazan, Gur-
Yaish, & Campa, 2004). As romantic partner representations are more salient than other social 
representations (e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Pietromonaco, DeBuse, & Powers, 2013), we 
hypothesized that judgments for self and romantic partners would share a common pattern of 
brain activity encompassing the salience network, a collection of brain regions implicated in the 
detection and processing of salient environmental stimuli (Uddin et al., 2015). 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were 29 healthy, right-handed young adults (16 females, 13 males; 
M age = 24 years, SD = 3.5 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and no 
history of psychiatric, neurological, or other medical illness that could compromise cognitive 
functions. Participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the Institutional 
Review Board of Cornell University. Participants were selected for the scanning procedure based 
on the study criteria of being in a long-term, committed, exclusive romantic relationship.  
Assessment of attachment 
We recruited participants on the basis of romantic relationship length and characteristics, 
asking that participants be in an exclusive and committed relationship for around two years or 
longer. Two years is an important milestone within adult attachment theory, as it is the time 
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around which full-fledged attachment bonds have formed (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). The average 
participant relationship length (measured in months) was well above twenty-four (M=39.55 
months, SD= 17.13). 
Participants completed a pre-scan survey about their various personal relationships. 
Participants first provided one name per relationship condition in response to prompts (see 
Appendix 3.A). This survey included self-report measures of attachment (WHOTO; Fraley & 
Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 1991), perceived closeness (Inclusion of Other in Self, IOS; Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992), and relationship length. Additionally, the survey included the 
Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised Partner Specific (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 
2000), Friendship-Based Love Scale (Grote & Frieze, 1994), Passionate Love Scale (Hatfield & 
Sprecher, 1986), and a partner-specific questionnaire designed to assess relationship quality 
factors, such as satisfaction, commitment, exclusivity, and emotional investment (see Appendix 
3.A). We confirmed participants’ attachment relationships and subsequent inclusion in the study 
based on these self-report variables.  
The WHOTO (Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 1991) is an attachment functions 
measure that determines the people with whom subjects display attachment relationships. Items 
are based on four attachment features: proximity seeking, separation distress, safe haven, and 
secure base. Subjects list up to four most important figures in their lives for each of the ten items. 
The WHOTO can be used in various ways to measure individuals’ attachment to others. In the 
present study, we used the WHOTO in two distinct ways. First, we utilized it as a continuous 
measure of attachment with romantic partners, parent, and friends by scoring each item based on 
the individual’s ranking (highest scores = listed first) and totaling these scores; therefore higher 
WHOTO total scores were indicative of greater levels of attachment. Second, we examined the 
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presence of primary attachments to either romantic partner or parent by scoring each item on a 
binary of “[partner/parent] listed first?” = 1 and “[partner/parent] not listed first?” = 0. 
We also investigated social cognitive closeness using the IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992). This scale is a single-item pictorial measure of closeness and interconnectedness 
in dyads. The seven instances of two overlapping circles of the IOS range from mutually 
exclusive to highly overlapping in appearance. The IOS is a direct self-report measure of 
perceived closeness with relationship partners, as it is a visual representation of how individuals 
think of others and themselves. 
Task and fMRI Design 
 During fMRI scanning, we used a trait-judgment task (c.f. Grigg & Grady, 2010) in 
which participants were asked to think about several people in their lives mentioned by name in 
the pre-scan survey. Each trial contained a trait adjective and a person’s name; participants rated 
the person on each trait adjective, on a scale of 1 (unlike this person) to 3 (very much like this 
person). Blocks were composed of 5 trials in which participants were instructed to hold the 
person in mind continuously while making each trait judgment about that person. Blocks were 
interleaved with 10 seconds of fixation. We also included a motor control condition block, in 
which participants were prompted with “Which number?”, shown a number 1, 2, or 3, and 
instructed to respond by pushing the button corresponding to that number. 
The experiment consisted of 350 trials divided across 5 runs, each consisting of 14 blocks, 
in turn comprising 5 trials per block. Trials were 3-seconds long, and a 1-second crosshair 
fixation screen appeared between each trial. There were 2 blocks per run for each of the 7 
conditions (partner, parent, close friend, familiar acquaintance, famous person, self and “which 
number” motor control). See Figure 3.1 for behavioral paradigm. The order of conditions within 
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each run was randomized. Each task run lasted 7 minutes and 40 seconds. The 5 runs were then 
counterbalanced for each participant to eliminate any possibility of ordering effects of the fixed 
condition order and adjective order. 
Numerous participants reported uncertainty in performing this task for the famous person 
condition, and the neural results were a multivariate outlier. For these reasons, the famous person 
condition was excluded from subsequent analyses and interpretation. 
Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Behavioral paradigm, involving trait-judgment task for social others 
 
 50 trait adjectives were selected for the study in order to ensure that each word was used 
exactly once for each condition. The trait adjectives were selected from a list of popularly used 
personality terms (Anderson, 1968). The trait adjectives were presented in a fixed order across 
blocks, such that each trait adjective was paired exactly once with each condition. 
Magnetic Resonance Image Acquisition 
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 Brain imaging data were acquired using a 3T GE Discovery MR750 MRI scanner with a 
32-channel head coil. This MRI scanner was located within the Cornell Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Facility in Ithaca, New York. Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1-weighted 
volumetric MRI magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (TR = 7.7 ms; TE = 3.4 ms; 7° flip 
angle; 1.0 mm voxels with no gap, 176 slices). Five 7 m 40 s experimental runs of blood–oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) functional scans were acquired with a T2*- weighted multi-echo 
imaging pulse sequence (TR = 2000 ms; TEs = 12.7, 27.5, and 43 ms; 77° flip angle; 33 axial 
slices; matrix size = 64 x 64; field of view (FOV) = 240 mm; 33 axial slices; 3.8 mm thick slices).   
Preprocessing of Magnetic Resonance Imaging Data 
 BOLD fMRI data were preprocessed to correct for motion, physiological noise and 
scanner artifacts using Multi-Echo Independent Components Analysis (ME-ICA) with meica.py 
(Kundu et al., 2012). ME-ICA is a method for de-noising fMRI data based on information about 
the T2* decay of the BOLD signal, acquired through multi-echo fMRI. Using ME-ICA, multi-
echo fMRI datasets can be decomposed into independent components before these components 
are categorized as BOLD or noise/non-BOLD. ME-ICA robustly de-noises fMRI data by 
removing all non-BOLD components (Kundu et al., 2012; Lombardo et al., 2016). Within the 
ME-ICA program, the BOLD fMRI images were also normalized, spatially, to the standard space 
of the MNI template. Subsequently, data were resampled to 2x2x2-voxel volumetric time-series 
and smoothed with a 6-mm full width half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.  
fMRI Analysis 
Partial Least Squares  
 Task-based analyses were performed using the multivariate technique partial least 
squares (PLS), a multivariate functional neuroimaging analysis technique used to identify whole-
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brain patterns of activity that are correlated with tasks (Krishnan, Williams, McIntosh, & Abdi, 
2011; McIntosh, Chau, & Protzner, 2004). PLS identifies a set of orthogonal latent variables 
(LVs) that optimally relate BOLD signal and the experimental design. The statistical significance 
of the detected patterns is assessed through permutation testing, whereas reliability is determined 
in an independent step by iterative bootstrap resampling with replacement.  
PLS is sensitive to a distributed voxel response, rather than the activity of individual 
voxels per se, and assesses the covariance between brain voxels (BOLD signal) and the 
experimental design to identify a limited number of orthogonal components (LVs) that optimally 
relate the two. This data-driven approach determines orthogonal whole-brain patterns of activity 
that covary with the experimental design. Within the PLS framework, brain activity is 
constrained to examine the covariance between brain activity and task design. In this regard, we 
are able to examine robust patterns of activity only associated with the experimental conditions. 
Along these same lines, PLS is capable of analyzing multiple conditions simultaneously to 
examine covariance of response across conditions. The current study design was optimized for a 
PLS analysis to assess distributed patterns of activity across conditions.  
Activity for each voxel was averaged across blocks for each relationship condition and 
normalized relative to activity at fixation preceding the trait judgment. The data matrix was 
expressed as a voxel-by-voxel deviation from the grand mean across the entire experiment, 
which was decomposed using singular value decomposition to derive the LVs representing task 
contrasts. Each brain voxel is given a singular value weight, known as a salience (akin to a 
component loading in principle component analysis), which is proportional to the covariance of 
voxel activity with the task contrast represented by each LV. Multiplying the salience by the 
BOLD signal value in that voxel and summing the product across all voxels gives a composite 
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brain activity score for each participant on a given LV. We then used these brain scores to 
examine similarities and differences in brain activity across conditions and across participants. 
Greater activity in brain areas with positive (or negative) weights on a specific LV yields 
positive (or negative) mean brain scores for a given condition. PLS results can be interpreted as 
identifying co-varying sets of brain regions in which activity is reliably associated with the 
specific condition-wise contrasts represented by each LV.  
The significance of each LV was determined by permutation testing, using 500 
permutations with random reordering of the task conditions for each participant. PLS is 
recalculated for each permutation sample, and the frequency in which the permuted singular 
value exceeds the observed singular values is determined and expressed as a probability. In a 
second, independent, step the reliability of the saliences for the brain voxels across participants, 
characterizing each pattern identified by an LV, was determined by bootstrap resampling with 
replacement, using 100 iterations, to estimate the standard errors for each voxel. We set a 
minimum bootstrap ratio (conceptually similar to a Z-score) at 2.58 equivalent to p < 0.01. 
Because the analysis is performed across voxels in a single step, no correction for multiple 
comparisons is required. 
Systematic region of interest (ROI) analyses were conducted for several seed regions 
within mPFC, utilizing 9 peak coordinates from a recent parcellation of this region (de la Vega et 
al., 2016). ROIs were extracted from the following areas and corresponding MNI coordinates: 
supplementary motor area (SMA; 0, -14, 54), pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA; 0, 4, 62), 
posterior dorsal midcingulate cortex (pdMCC; 0, 12, 50), anterior dorsal midcingulate cortex 
(adMCC, 0, 28, 48), posterior ventral midcingulate cortex (pvMCC; 0, -2, 30), anterior ventral 
midcingulate cortex (avMCC; 0, 36, 24), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC; 0, 50, 28), 
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pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC; 0, 46, 8), and ventral medial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC; 0, 48, -12). Using PLS, we performed a multiple-voxel extraction with a neighborhood 
size of 1 for each of these coordinates. This analytic approach yielded mean response intensities, 
averaged across subjects, for each condition. Each region was submitted to a simple t-test to 
evaluate activation against baseline. We report on this analysis for each of the 9 ROIs. 
Results 
Behavioral Results; Assessment of Attachment 
Our first analyses examined two critical measures: reported attachment status (WHOTO) 
and closeness (IOS) between romantic partners, parents, and friends. Descriptive statistics for 
these measures are in Table 3.1. We initially conducted repeated measures ANOVA tests across 
WHOTO total scores and across IOS scores. Results showed a significant difference between 
means of romantic partner, parent, and friend WHOTO scores (F(2, 56) = 22.14, p < 0.001). 
Results of non-parametric analyses mirrored these ANOVA results, as a Friedman test yielded 
significant differences among repeated measures χ 2 (2, N = 29) = 40.55, p < 0.001. We 
conducted this non-parametric test to account for alternative perspectives that consider WHOTO 
scores as ordinal data. Results also showed a significant difference between means of romantic 
partner, parent, and friend IOS scores (F(2, 56) = 68.00, p < 0.001).  
We ran several post-hoc t-tests to clarify the nature of attachment-related differences 
between specific comparison groups of interest. Results showed that participants reported 
significantly greater attachment to romantic partners over parents (t(56) = 5.22 p < 0.001) and 
closeness with partners over parents (t(56) = 5.52, p < 0.001). Participants also reported 
significantly greater attachment to romantic partners over friends (t(56) = 13.69, p < 0.001) and 
closeness with partners over friends (t(56) = 5.08, p < 0.001). Lastly, participants reported 
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significantly greater attachment to parents over friends (t(56) = 7.28, p < 0.001), but there was no 
difference in reported closeness between parents and friends (t(56) = -0.09, p = 0.92). Taken 
together, these results demonstrate that participants’ romantic partners and parents were 
attachment figures—with participants showing more attachment to partners than parents—
whereas friends were, on average, not attachment figures for the participants. Our general 
categorization of friends as non-attachment figures is supported by previous theoretical work and 
behavioral results suggesting young adults’ relationships with friends do not show characteristic 
features of attachment bonds (Hazan & Zeifman, 1994; Fraley & Davis, 1997). 
Importantly, we further utilized participants’ WHOTO data to determine their primary 
attachment figures. Most participants listed their romantic partners first across several WHOTO 
items. This distinction was especially pronounced for the WHOTO items reflecting proximity 
seeking, separation distress, and safe haven, whereas participants listed parents and partners first 
at about equal rates for secure base; this finding reflections past observations about the transition 
of primary attachment figures from parents to partners in early adulthood, with secure base often 
the final feature to be primarily directed towards partners (Hazan & Zeifman, 1999; Nickerson & 
Nagle, 2005). Overall, these results provide strong evidence that romantic partners served as 
participants' primary attachment figures, whereas parents did not. 
Neuroimaging Results 
 The PLS analysis focused on investigating neural activity changes across relationship 
conditions (partner, parent, friend, acquaintance, self, and control). PLS analyses revealed two 
significant patterns of activity.  
 The first significant LV separated all social other- representations from the control (i.e. 
number matching) condition. This result replicates previous findings implicating the default 
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network in mentalizing about others (Mar, 2011; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). Significant 
activations for this LV were found within areas of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and PCC. Other significant activations for this LV were 
observed in occipital cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, temporal pole, thalamus, superior temporal 
sulcus, cerebellum, anterior temporal lobe, caudate head, middle cingulate gyrus, basal ganglia, 
precentral gyrus, and intracalcarine cortex (Figure 3.2, Table 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2.
 
 
Figure 3.2. Results of the task PLS analysis contrasting activity across partner, parent, close 
friend, familiar acquaintance, self, and control conditions; LV1 Activation map & brain scores 
with 95% confidence intervals. Brain scores represent cross product of the group result image 
and the individual subject BOLD response for each given LV. Warm colors on activation maps 
(red, orange, yellow) correspond to positive brain scores, shown by red plotted bars. Cool colors 
on activation maps (shades of blue) correspond to negative brain scores, shown by the blue 
plotted bars. (Left) Lateral and medial views of left hemisphere. (Center) Dorsal view. (Right) 
Lateral and medial views of right hemisphere. 
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A second significant LV was observed, central to our hypothesis regarding differentiation 
of attached romantic partner representations versus parent and friend representations. This LV 
dissociated brain activity for partner and self from parent and friend. Anterior insula, anterior and 
middle cingulate, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) were associated with partner and 
self representations. Activations in frontal gyrus, occipital fusiform gyrus, cerebellum, precuneus, 
frontal pole, supramarginal gyrus, anterior superior frontal sulcus, occipital cortex, thalamus, 
precentral gyrus, posterior dmPFC were also associated with partner and self representations. In 
contrast, parent and friend judgments engaged left temporal pole and parahippocampal gyrus. 
Acquaintance and motor control conditions did not contribute to the multivariate pattern (Figure 
3.3, Table 3.3).  
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Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Results of the task PLS analysis contrasting activity across partner, parent, close 
friend, familiar acquaintance, self, and control conditions; LV2 Activation map & Brain scores 
with 95% confidence intervals. Brain scores represent cross product of the group result image 
and the individual subject BOLD response for each given LV. Warm colors on activation maps 
(red, orange, yellow) correspond to positive brain scores, shown by red plotted bars. Cool colors 
on activation maps (shades of blue) correspond to negative brain scores, shown by the blue 
plotted bars. (Left) Lateral and medial views of left hemisphere. (Center) Dorsal view. (Right) 
Lateral and medial views of right hemisphere.  
 
 
  69 
For our ROI analyses, we conducted simple t-tests (α = 0.05) comparing each condition’s 
voxel intensity response against baseline. Distinct patterns of response were observed for 
specific areas within mPFC. Most notably, results showed significant positive activation 
intensity for dmPFC and adMCC across all of the social cognitions (partner, parent, friend, 
acquaintance, and self). This pattern was similar for vmPFC, with partner, parent, and friend 
showing significant positive intensities, avMCC, with partner, friend, acquaintance, and self 
showing significant positive intensities, and pgACC, with partner and self showing significant 
positive intensities (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4. Results of ROI analysis examining 9 seed regions within mPFC. Significance is 
shown through the different colors within the bar graphs; red plotted bars correspond with 
significant positive response intensities, blue plotted bars correspond with significant negative 
response intensities, and clear plotted bars correspond with non-significance.   
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Discussion 
 
The present study aimed to determine how mental representations of other individuals in 
our social world reflect underlying patterns of neural activity and, more specifically, how our 
brains represent others with whom we share attachment bonds. First, we successfully replicated 
findings on mentalizing (Heatherton et al. 2006; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; Mar, 2011), as 
all social conditions and the self condition engaged regions of the default network including 
dmPFC, vmPFC, and PCC, in addition to lateral PFC. Second, our results showed that presence 
of a primary attachment bond modulated neural activation associated with the mental 
representation of others. Specifically, anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and posterior STS 
were associated with representations of attached romantic partner and self versus less-close 
others. Lastly, our ROI analysis results highlighted the role of vmPFC and dmPFC in 
representing social others and the self, with rostral cingulum regions showing robust activation 
for romantic partner. 
In line with our predictions, results replicated the role of the default network in social 
cognitive processing, including mentalizing (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Mar, 2011). Increased 
activation within dmPFC, vmPFC, PCC was associated with all of the conditions involving 
mentalizing, a critical component of social cognition (Mar, 2011), versus the control condition. 
Default network brain regions have been associated with attributional decisions, judgments of 
others’ emotional states (Haas, Anderson, & Filkowski, 2015), and imagining the experiences of 
others (Hassabis et al., 2014; Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). Activations outside the default 
network were also observed. Recruitment of lateral PFC has been observed in studies of social 
cognitive reasoning (Mar, 2011), consistent with the role of maintaining social information 
online (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). The left lateralization is also consistent with verbally 
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mediated processes (Nagel et al., 2013). Activity in thalamus, basal ganglia, and caudate could 
indicate recruitment of the limbic system for emotional regulation in response to social cues 
(Coan, Schafer, & Davidson, 2006). Occipital cortex activity, often related to visual object 
recognition (Malach et al., 1995), was possibly recruited in imagining images of social others. 
A second significant pattern dissociated brain activity for judgments about partner and 
self from parent and friend. Increased activation in anterior cingulate, anterior insula and 
posterior STS was observed in mentalizing about partner and self. These regions have been 
implicated in social cognitive processes crucial for close bond formation, such as empathy 
(Decety & Jackson, 2006). The pattern of brain activity associated with partner and self 
judgment is consistent with the topology of the salience network (Seeley et al., 2006). The 
salience network, including regions such as anterior insula and anterior cingulate, is thought to 
coordinate responses to environmental stimuli that are most important to an individual (see 
Uddin, 2015, for review), such as representations of primary attachment figures and self, 
suggesting that this network may differentiate representations of self and romantic partners 
serving as primary attachment figures from other social representations. These results 
demonstrate that nuanced differences between neural representations of salient social figures 
(partner, parent, friend, and self) are likely associated with differences in attachment status. 
Engagement of the salience network dichotomized our attachment schema, showing greater 
activation during mentalizing about one’s self or a romantic partner versus one’s parent or a 
friend.  
Contrary to previous work suggesting the default and salience networks work in 
opposition (Hermans et al., 2014), we found these networks are recruited together to represent 
romantic partners and the self. The antagonistic relationship observed between these networks in 
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past research may have more to do with the tasks used, which do not assess personal significance 
as we do in the present work. Our results confirm these networks work in concert, similar to 
research showing both competition and interdependence between default network function and 
salience network integrity (Bonelle et al., 2012). Research in moral cognition also suggests an 
interactive role for these two networks (Sevinc & Spreng, under review). Salience network 
regions such as anterior insula detect both internal and external salient events, interacting with 
the default network to process internal events specifically. We observed this interaction in the 
unique neural response to attached romantic partners and the self, wherein the default network is 
engaged in construction and utilization of social representations and the salience network is 
selectively attuned to the most meaningful of these representations.  
Since cognitive representations of attachment figures are chronically accessible and serve 
emotion-regulatory functions, they are understood to be different in content and use from 
representations of less-close others (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Pietromonaco, Feldman 
Barrett, & Powers, 2006). The mental representations we form of close others are composed of 
perceptually salient social memories and, yet, are differentiable depending on the specific person 
about whom we are thinking. As a pair bond forms, a romantic partner becomes integrated into 
one’s sense of self — into one’s head (Aron et al., 1991) and “under [one’s] skin” (Pietromonaco, 
DeBuse, & Powers, 2013). Recent work in neurobiology highlights biobehavioral synchrony as a 
characteristic of pair bonds (Feldman, 2016). In many cases, the presence of intrinsically 
rewarding contact comfort and sexual activity also enables romantic attachment relationships 
that are uniquely intimate in nature (Zayas, Merrill, & Hazan, 2015). Our finding that 
representations of romantic attachment partners and of the self have common neural 
underpinnings confirmed these theoretical principles. 
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In early development, parents serve as our primary attachment figures, a role often 
supplanted by romantic partners in young adulthood (Hazan & Zeifman, 1999; Nickerson & 
Nagle, 2005). Both our self-report and neuroimaging results note this social-psychological 
distinction; romantic partners were predominately nominated by participants as primary 
attachment figures. Furthermore, we observed that overall romantic partner attachment was 
higher than parent attachment, closeness to a parent as measured by the IOS was no different 
from closeness to a friend, and friend and parent brain activity covaried together. Our findings 
indicate that, although both romantic partners and parents categorically served as attachment 
figures for participants, there are subtle differences in attachment status across these categories—
observable in both brain and behavior—that require further exploration. We assert these 
differences are related to the distinctive status of primary attachment figures and, relatedly, to the 
unique physical and emotional intimacy of romantic relationships. These differences could be 
better understood by asking participants additional questions about the nature of their romantic 
relationships, such as “Do you currently share a home with this person?”. 
Left temporal pole and parahippocampal gyrus showed increased activity for parent and 
friend over partner and self. Recent work suggests that parahippocampal regions play a critical 
role in judgments of trustworthiness and uncertainty (Bhatt et al., 2012). Parahippocampal 
involvement may reflect visual input related to the task or the retrieval of previous experiences 
with the person about whom the participant was making a judgment (Aminoff, Kveraga, & Bar, 
2013). The temporal pole is thought to integrate social conceptual knowledge, enabling processes 
like empathy (Pehrs et al., 2015) and sharing others’ embarrassment (Müller-Pinzler; Paulus et 
al., 2014). Within the context of our experimental paradigm, these neural regions may uniquely 
contribute to trait judgment for these individuals of varied closeness. These activity patterns 
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could be associated with differences in cognitive processing necessary to access more distal 
social conceptual knowledge for others who are close to us but not primary attachment figures, 
for whom judgments are more readily retrieved. 
Results of our ROI analyses confirmed the role played by dorsal and ventral areas of 
mPFC in social cognition. We found activity in dmPFC and vmPFC was robustly associated with 
thinking about all social others and the self. Our results support the functional separation noted in 
de la Vega and colleagues’ (2016) tripartite mPFC parcellation. These subregions fall within the 
“anterior zone” and, in the present study, also fit within the functional profile of this zone, 
important for social cognition, affect, decision making, and episodic memory (de la Vega et al., 
2016). We note, consistent with the second latent variable, that rostral cingulum regions 
demonstrated a robust response to romantic partner.  
Overall, these findings enhance our understanding of neural representations of known 
others and how attachment modulates these representations. As our experimental stimuli 
included names of real individuals, highly-relevant to each participant, our findings provide 
ecologically valid evidence that mentalizing about close others is associated with different 
patterns of brain activation depending on social proximity and attachment.  Unlike previous 
studies, which involved more passive tasks (e.g. viewing photos of known others), our paradigm 
required active mentalizing about personalized, social targets. Our initial findings provided 
validation of this paradigm by replicating previous findings of default network activation 
associated with mentalizing about known others and provided the first evidence that this 
association is consistent across multiple levels of social closeness. The second pattern of activity 
provided unique insights with respect to modulation of these neural representations by 
attachment. The covariance of partner and self, showing activity within the salience network, 
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suggests that we form highly overlapping neural representations for ourselves and romantic 
attachment figures. Interpretation of our results provides a potential mechanistic explanation for 
the differentiated neural response to close others; while the default network more broadly 
supports social cognition for known others and the self, recruitment of the salience network is 
critical for capturing the nuanced representations, and their significance, of our most “intimate” 
adult relationships: romantic partners serving as primary attachment figures and the self.  
Our findings provide empirical evidence to support recent work on the topic of 
attachment indicating that human attachment representations recruit cortical and subcortical 
networks for processes such as mentalization and reward (Feldman, 2016). Future work should 
further consider the role of attachment in dissociable patterns of brain activity. The neural 
correlates of relationship quality factors—specifically, attachment styles (e.g., secure, anxious, 
avoidant)—remain undiscovered. Further investigations could examine individual differences in 
attachment styles and neural foundations of mentalizing processes. In the current study, we 
leveraged valid and reliable self-report measures that reflect participants’ potential attachments. 
Our set of measures provides extensive information about participants’ thoughts, behaviors, and 
emotions within the context of their close relationships. For future studies involving known 
others, we recommend the administration of these measures as a standardized battery to assess 
the construct of adult attachment.  
 With this study, we introduce a common framework across disciplines to inform 
investigations of the neural basis of social attachment as a deeper view of social cognitive 
neuroscience. Attachment figure mental representations play a powerful role in assisting 
individuals with emotion regulation and navigation of their social environments. Further 
investigations could provide significant insight into how the brain represents attachment, perhaps 
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the most important consequence of real-world social interactions. Our findings support the 
hypothesis that mentalizing about different attachment figures – individuals from whom we seek 
proximity, security, and comfort – may engage unique brain response patterns. By utilizing adult 
attachment as one end of a spectrum of personal closeness, we can begin to disentangle some of 
the important functional areas and networks of the brain recruited in social cognition. 
Attachment styles and patterns of behavior are well-studied within social psychology; attachment 
theory may therefore provide neuroscientists with behavioral constructs at a high level of 
specificity with respect to social proximity. Here we provide preliminary support for the idea that, 
by utilizing attachment criteria, we can implement more directed empirical studies to 
differentiate how social relationships are represented in the brain.  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Measures 
Measure Romantic 
Partner 
Parent Close Friend Acquaintance 
WHOTO (M, SD) 
Out of 40 
 
32.83, 6.80 22.31, 8.46 6.97, 7.56 - 
IOS (M, SD) 
Out of 7 
 
4.83, 1.23 2.93, 1.39 2.97, 1.55 1.55, 0.69 
Relationship 
Length (M, SD) 
In months 
 
39.55, 17.13 274.76, 57.76 83.52, 65.82 50.35, 48.12 
“How well do you 
know this 
person?” (M, SD) 
Out of 5 
 
4.79, 0.63 4.43, 0.98 4.31, 0.66 2.93, 0.88 
“How familiar are 
you with this 
person?” (M, SD) 
Out of 5 
4.79, 0.63 4.57, 0.95 4.45, 0.74 3.17, 1.00 
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Table 3.2. Peak Activation Coordinates, LV1 
Region Coordinates   BSR 
 x y z  
Social > Control     
Medial Prefrontal Cortex -10 58 30 -11.54 
Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex -8 20 56 -11.43 
Occipital Cortex -26 -94 4 -11.21 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus -58 24 14 -11.01 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex -8 -50 32 -10.75 
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex -4 54 -16 -9.52 
Temporal Pole -44 8 -38 -9.01 
Occipital Cortex 18 -102 -10 -8.77 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 26 16 -22 -6.56 
Thalamus -8 -14 8 -6.50 
Superior Temporal Sulcus -54 -12 -8 -6.08 
Cerebellum 4 -62 -40 -6.05 
Anterior Temporal Lobe 62 0 -28 -6.04 
Head of Caudate -16 10 14 -5.64 
Cerebellum 2 -58 -52 -4.81 
Middle Cingulate Cortex -2 -12 38 -4.66 
Angular Gyrus -50 -60 30 -4.64 
Superior Temporal Sulcus 42 -34 0 -4.10 
Pallidum/Basal Ganglia -26 -8 -6 -3.77 
Precentral Gyrus -36 -20 52 -3.60 
Intracalcarine Cortex 20 -66 6 -3.33 
     
Control > Social     
Intraparietal sulcus 58 -44 46 10.47 
Posterior Middle Cingulate -12 -28 44 9.91 
MT+ 48 -54 4 8.48 
Lateral Occipital Cortex -42 -82 30 8.44 
Intraparietal sulcus -56 -36 52 8.43 
MT+ -64 -62 -4 7.77 
Mid- Insula -44 -4 -2 7.16 
SMA (Supplementary Motor Area) -12 -10 62 6.81 
Mid- Insula 38 -12 -6 6.21 
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate 4 10 32 6.12 
Thalamus 14 -30 2 5.59 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 44 40 0 5.41 
Posterior Superior Frontal Gyrus 24 12 54 5.40 
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Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex -32 32 38 5.34 
Inferior Temporal Cortex -62 -40 -26 5.33 
Parahippocampus/Brain Stem 16 -16 -30 5.27 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 40 40 24 4.94 
Lingual Gyrus -32 -42 -8 4.81 
Cerebellum -38 -44 -46 4.75 
Cerebellum -16 -74 -48 4.54 
Precentral Gyrus 38 -4 52 4.34 
Posterior Superior Frontal Gyrus -22 8 58 4.24 
Frontal Pole 34 56 -16 3.84 
Medial Orbital Sulcus 16 34 -20 3.64 
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Table 3.3. Peak Activation Coordinates, LV2 
Region Coordinates   BSR 
 x y z  
Partner, Self > Parent, Friend, 
Acquaintance 
    
Middle Frontal Gyrus 40 10 56 6.99 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus -28 -66 -2 6.64 
Cerebellum -42 -52 -40 6.34 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 22 -84 -2 6.30 
Dorsal Precuneus 16 -64 48 6.18 
Dorsal Precuneus -22 -76 50 6.06 
Frontal Pole 16 68 2 6.06 
Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus 48 -52 4 5.60 
Middle Cingulate Gyrus -4 -18 36 5.50 
Supramarginal Gyrus -70 -42 30 5.15 
Anterior Superior Frontal Sulcus 24 42 34 4.90 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 10 32 26 4.52 
Occipital Cortex -30 -100 18 4.47 
Thalamus 22 -26 -2 4.34 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 14 20 58 4.23 
Precuneus -10 -66 40 4.20 
Ventral Anterior Cingulate Cortex 10 30 -8 4.20 
Precentral Gyrus -40 0 46 4.16 
Cerebellum -16 -60 -62 4.07 
Anterior Superior Frontal Sulcus -18 42 28 4.07 
Cerebellum -36 -90 -34 4.06 
Cerebellum -56 -66 -40 4.01 
Posterior Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex -10 12 56 3.95 
Frontal Pole 42 46 0 3.89 
Middle Frontal Gyrus -32 30 40 3.88 
Cerebellum 40 -60 -40 3.85 
Superior Temporal Sulcus -56 -22 -2 3.85 
Frontal Pole -20 70 4 3.82 
Cerebellum -46 -68 -56 3.68 
Cerebellum 12 -54 -46 3.67 
Rostral Anterior Cingulate -4 40 10 3.67 
Precuneus 6 -46 54 3.66 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus -60 20 14 3.51 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 52 16 2 3.43 
Rostral Anterior Cingulate 0 48 -4 3.41 
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Inferior precentral sulcus 62 12 12 3.36 
Superior Frontal Gyrus -12 24 56 3.25 
Anterior Insula 28 18 -10 3.23 
Anterior Insula -36 14 -12 3.07 
     
Parent, Friend > Partner, Self     
Temporal Pole -34 10 -34 -5.19 
Parahippocampal Cortex -24 -2 -42 -3.54 
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CHAPTER 4 
Mentalizing about known others is associated with altered default network interactivity in 
older adulthood  
Throughout the life course, we constantly form, update, and use cognitive representations 
of social others. Human social environments comprise complex hierarchies and feature wide 
spectra of relationships, ranging in proximity from close others and attachment figures to 
recently formed acquaintances. As close social relationships have been shown to confer various 
psychological and physiological benefits throughout the lifespan (Carstensen et al., 1996; 
Hoppmann & Gerstorf, 2009), it is perhaps one of our most crucial human cognitive capacities to 
be able to differentiate representations of close from less-close others in our social world.  
Social cognition, and specifically our capacity to form and access representations of 
known others, has been associated with multiple brain systems. Social and evolutionary 
psychological theories have emphasized the highly-rewarding and functionally-adaptive nature 
of close social bonds, implicating the brain’s reward and distress-alleviation systems (e.g., 
Acevedo et al., 2012; Bartels & Zeki, 2004; Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006).  In contrast, 
cognitive psychological theories have focused on the specific processes through which 
representations of social others are formed, stored, and accessed, investigating how these 
processes and representations are implemented in the brain (e.g., Beckes, Coan, & Hasselmo, 
2013; Heatherton, et al., 2006, Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). This latter line of research, 
emphasizing the processing of social representations, has implicated a number of brain areas in 
mentalizing, or attending to the mental state or characteristics of known others. These regions of 
the ‘social brain’ (Mitchell, 2008) closely overlap with the default network (DN), a functionally-
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connected assembly of brain regions that has been associated with internal mentation and social 
cognitive processing (for review, see Spreng & Andrews-Hanna, 2015).  
The default network is composed of areas along the cortical midline, including dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), as well as medial and lateral temporal cortices, lateral parietal lobes, and 
caudal portions of the lateral prefrontal cortex (Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2007). Together, these regions have been implicated in our ability to imagine the experiences of 
others (Hassabis et al., 2014; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009), attribute and judge emotional states 
(Haas, Anderson, & Filkowski, 2015), reflect on beliefs (Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010), 
and form social impressions of known others (Cassidy & Gutchess, 2012).  
Social representations may be stratified along multiple dimensions, including personal 
similarity (Mitchell et al., 2006), relational hierarchy (Tavares et al., 2015), and social proximity 
or ‘closeness’ (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010). Recent evidence suggests that these various 
dimensions of social-relatedness differentially impact how representations of social others are 
implemented in the brain (Thornton and Mitchell, 2017). In this context, social proximity (or 
closeness) in particular has been strongly implicated in the differential recruitment of the default 
network during social-cognitive tasks (Krienen et al., 2010; Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago & 
Haxby, 2004). Further, there is evidence that interactivity between default brain regions and 
other neural networks may be critical in the stratification of one’s social world. For example, 
interactions between the default network and the medial temporal lobe memory system have 
been shown to support navigation of, or tracking shifting dynamics in and responding to,  
interpersonal relationships based on social affiliation and power hierarchies (Tavares et al., 2015). 
Similarly, we have recently shown interactions between the default network and brain regions 
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implicated in detecting personally salient stimuli (i.e. salience network, Uddin, 2015) during trait 
judgments of oneself and romantic partners but not for more socially distant others (Laurita, 
Hazan, & Spreng, 2017). 
While much of the existing research investigating neural representations of social others 
has relied on young adult cohorts, few studies have examined this in older adults (e.g. Ebner et 
al., 2011; Ebner et al., 2013). Various social-cognitive abilities change across the adult lifespan, 
with evidence of both gains and losses (see Ebner et al., 2016 for a recent review). Within the 
domain of mentalizing about social others, the evidence for age-related change is somewhat 
equivocal. In a recent neuroimaging investigation, older adults performed more poorly than 
young on assessments of moral judgment and false-beliefs (Moran, Jolly, and Mitchell, 2012). In 
contrast, Castelli and colleagues (2010) reported equivalent performance for older and younger 
adults on a theory of mind task. As mentalizing about social others may depend on fluid 
intellectual or executive control processes (e.g. German and Hehman, 2006; Charlton et al., 
2009), age-related declines in cognitive control may contribute to reduced social cognition in 
later life, although this idea remains controversial (Maylor, Moulson, Muncer & Taylor, 2002; 
Sullivan and Ruffman, 2004).  
At the level of the brain, regions implicated in social functioning closely overlap with the 
default network (Mitchell, 2008). The default network undergoes significant change in  normal 
aging, with evidence of reduced within network and increased between network connectivity 
(see Damoiseaux et al., 2017 for a review). It seems plausible then that these age-related changes 
may be associated with differences in mentalizing abilities between older and younger adults. 
Only a few studies have investigated this possibility directly. Moran and colleagues (2012) 
reported that activity in a core node of the default network, dmPFC, was reduced in older versus 
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younger adults during a series of social-cognitive tasks involving inferences about the intent, 
actions, and mental states of others. In another investigation, activity in dmPFC as well as other 
core default network nodes, including vmPFC and PCC, was reduced during negative (and 
increased during positive) impression formation in older versus younger adults (Cassidy, 
Leshikar, Shih, Aizenman & Gutchess, 2014). In contrast, an earlier study reported no age 
differences in activation or functional connectivity of the default network during a mentalizing 
task (Castelli et al., 2010). Interestingly, no performance differences were observed between the 
groups in this study, prompting the authors to speculate that greater recruitment of lateral PFC 
regions may have supported mentalizing ability in the older cohort.  
Taken together, previous research suggests that for younger adults, the default network is 
implicated in social cognitive abilities, including mentalizing about social others. Further, the 
magnitude and topological pattern of default network engagement is modulated by social 
closeness. Despite well-documented changes in the default network with age, relatively little is 
known about how these changes impact mentalizing in older adulthood, and no studies have 
examined these changes across levels of closeness amongst known social others. Here we use 
fMRI to examine the neural representations of mentalizing about known others in young and 
older adults across a continuum of social closeness. Extending our recent study of young adults 
(Laurita et al., 2017), we used a trait-judgment task, to assess mentalizing, asking participants to 
make personal judgments about a romantic partner, a parent (young adults) or child (older adults), 
a close friend, a familiar acquaintance, and the self.  
Consistent with previous works implicating the default network in mentalizing (Andrews-
Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Cassidy et al., 2014; Mar, 2011; Mitchell, 2008; Moran et 
al., 2012) we predict that both age-groups would engage core default network nodes while 
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making trait judgments about known others. Critically however, we expect age-differences to 
emerge in the modulation of default network interactivity across levels of social closeness. We 
have previously shown differential default network coupling with salience network brain regions 
during mentalizing about close from more distal social others (Laurita et al., 2017).  However, a 
hallmark of neurocognitive aging is over-recruitment of lateral prefrontal brain regions during 
cognitive tasks (Grady, 2012), potentially reflecting greater reliance on control processes to 
support performance at lower levels of cognitive demand (Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009). 
Further, prefrontal and default network brain regions are functionally coupled and poorly 
modulated by task demand in older adults (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Heatherton et al., 2006; Rieck 
et al., 2017; Turner and Spreng, 2015). In the current study we predict that for older adults, 
default network engagement during the mentalizing task will show greater functional coupling 
with lateral prefrontal brain regions. In addition, default network interactions, as measured by 
connectivity with two heterogenous mPFC seeds (Denny et al., 2012; for review, see Wagner, 
Haxby, and Heatherton, 2012), will be less dynamic and poorly modulated by levels of social 
closeness during the mentalizing task.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were 29 healthy, right-handed young adults (16 females, 13 males; 
M age = 24 years, SD = 3.5 years) and 27 healthy older adults (12 females, 15 males; M age = 67 
years, SD = 6 years), with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. All older adults scored 
over 26 on the Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975) and were not depressed, 
as measured by the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS; Yesavage et al., 1983). Participants had no 
history of psychiatric, neurological, or other medical illness that could compromise cognitive 
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functions. In accordance with the Institutional Review Board of Cornell University, participants 
gave written informed consent prior to scanning. Across both age groups, study participants were 
selected for the scanning procedure based on the study criterion of being in a long-term, 
committed, exclusive romantic relationship. Results from the younger adults have been 
previously reported (Laurita et al., 2017). 
Assessment of Self-Reported Closeness 
Participants completed a pre-scan survey about their various personal relationships. 
Participants first provided one name per relationship condition in response to prompts (see 
Appendix 4.A). This survey included self-report measures of attachment (WHOTO; Fraley & 
Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 1991) and perceived closeness (Inclusion of Other in Self, IOS; Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The WHOTO (Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 1991) is an 
attachment functions measure that determines the people with whom subjects display attachment 
relationships. Items are based on four attachment features: proximity seeking, separation distress, 
safe haven, and secure base. Subjects list up to four most important figures in their lives for each 
of the ten items. The WHOTO can be used in various ways to measure individuals’ attachment to 
others. We utilized it as a continuous measure of attachment with romantic partners, parent, and 
friends by scoring each item based on the individual’s ranking (highest scores = listed first) and 
totaling these scores; therefore higher WHOTO total scores were indicative of greater levels of 
attachment. We also investigated social cognitive closeness using the IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan, 1992). This scale is a single-item pictorial measure of closeness and interconnectedness 
in dyads. The seven instances of two overlapping circles of the IOS range from mutually 
exclusive to highly overlapping in appearance. The IOS is a direct self-report measure of 
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perceived closeness with relationship partners, as it is a visual representation of how individuals 
think of others and themselves. 
Behavioral Task and fMRI Design 
 During fMRI scans, we used a trait-judgment task (c.f. Grigg & Grady, 2010; Laurita, 
Hazan, & Spreng, 2017). Participants were asked to think about several people in their lives 
mentioned by name in a pre-scan survey they completed. See Appendix 4.A for pre-scan prompts 
for each target person. Each trial contained a trait adjective and a target person’s name; 
participants rated the target on each trait adjective, on a scale from 1 (unlike this person) to 3 
(very much like this person). Blocks comprised 5 trials, all referring to the same person, in which 
participants were instructed to hold the target in mind continuously while making each trait 
judgment about that person. Blocks were interleaved with 10 seconds of fixation. A motor 
control condition block was included, in which participants were prompted with “Which 
number?”, shown “1”, “2”, or “3” on the screen, and instructed to respond by pushing the button 
corresponding to that number. This particular control was chosen as it is a simple task for 
assessing baseline button-press response, it utilizes the same 3 buttons on the button box, it is 
non-social, in comparison to the other conditions, and it is consistent with prior block designs of 
mentalizing (e.g., Grigg & Grady, 2010), which allows for comparability between studies. 
The experiment consisted of 5 runs, each consisting of 14 blocks with 5 trials per block; 
there were 350 trials in total. Trials were 3-seconds long, with a 1-second crosshair fixation 
screen separating each trial. There were 2 blocks per run for each of the 7 conditions: partner, 
parent (seen by young adults) or child (seen by older adults), close friend, familiar acquaintance, 
famous person, self, and “which number” control. The order of conditions within each run was 
randomized. Each task run lasted 7 minutes and 40 seconds. The 5 runs were then 
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counterbalanced for each participant to eliminate any possibility of ordering effects of the fixed 
condition order and adjective order. See Figure 4.1 for an example of this behavioral paradigm. 
The famous person condition was excluded from subsequent analyses and interpretation due to 
numerous participant reports of uncertainty in performing this portion of the task. 
Fifty trait adjectives were selected for the study from a list of popularly used personality 
terms (Anderson, 1968). Adjectives were chosen at random but balanced for valence. See 
Appendix 4.B for list of adjectives. The trait adjectives were presented in a fixed order across 
blocks, such that each trait adjective was paired exactly once with each condition, or social other. 
Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1. Behavioral paradigm, involving trait-judgment task for social others. Scale responses 
correspond to: 1 (unlike this person) to 3 (very much like this person). 
 
Magnetic Resonance Image Acquisition and Preprocessing 
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 Brain imaging data were acquired using a 3T GE Discovery MR750 MRI scanner with a 
32-channel head coil. This MRI scanner was located within the Cornell Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Facility in Ithaca, New York. Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1-weighted 
volumetric MRI magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (TR = 7.7 ms; TE = 3.4 ms; 7° flip 
angle; 1.0 mm voxels with no gap, 176 slices). Five 7 m 40 s experimental runs of blood–oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) functional scans were acquired with a T2*- weighted multi-echo 
imaging pulse sequence (TR = 2000 ms; TEs = 12.7, 27.5, and 43 ms; 77° flip angle; 33 axial 
slices; matrix size = 64 x 64; field of view (FOV) = 240 mm; 33 axial slices; 3.8 mm thick slices).   
 BOLD fMRI data were preprocessed to correct for motion, physiological noise, and 
scanner artifacts using Multi-Echo Independent Components Analysis (ME-ICA) with meica.py 
(Kundu et al., 2012). ME-ICA de-noises fMRI data based on information about the T2* decay of 
the BOLD signal, acquired through multi-echo fMRI. Using ME-ICA, the multi-echo fMRI 
datasets was decomposed into independent components before these components were 
categorized as BOLD or noise/non-BOLD. ME-ICA robustly de-noised the fMRI data by 
removing all non-BOLD components (see Kundu, 2017 for review; Kundu et al., 2012; 
Lombardo et al., 2016).  
The BOLD fMRI images were normalized to a custom young-old population template 
derived from 50 younger (25 female; M = 22.02y, SD = 3.13y) and 50 older (25 female; M = 
67.14y, SD = 6.7y) adults. Included template subjects were selected from an in-house brain bank 
for low trait motion, as recent work has indicated that trait motion can bias structural scans 
(mean FD = 0.09; Savalia et al., 2017). Anatomical images for included subjects were affine 
registered to MNI space using  @toMNI_Awarp before being non-linearly, iteratively aligned 
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using @toMNI_Qwarpar in AFNI.  Data were resampled to 2x2x2-voxel volumetric time-series 
and smoothed with an 8-mm full width half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.  
Partial Least Squares fMRI Analysis 
Task Activation 
 Task-based analyses were performed using the multivariate technique partial least 
squares (PLS), a multivariate functional neuroimaging analysis technique used to identify whole-
brain patterns of activity or connectivity that are associated with tasks (Krishnan, Williams, 
McIntosh, & Abdi, 2011; McIntosh, Chau, & Protzner, 2004). PLS identifies a set of orthogonal 
latent variables (LVs) that optimally relate BOLD signal with the experimental design. The 
statistical significance of the detected brain response patterns is assessed through permutation 
testing, whereas reliability is determined in an independent step by iterative bootstrap resampling 
with replacement.  Because these analyses are performed across voxels in a single step, no 
correction for multiple comparisons is required. 
PLS is a data-driven approach that is sensitive to a distributed voxel response, rather than 
the activity of individual voxels per se, and assesses the covariance between brain voxels (BOLD 
signal) and the experimental design to identify a limited number of orthogonal components 
(LVs) that optimally relate brain voxels and experimental design. Using PLS, we were able to 
examine robust patterns of activity only associated with the experimental conditions. Along these 
same lines, PLS is capable of analyzing multiple conditions simultaneously to examine 
covariance of response across conditions. The current study design was optimized for a PLS 
analysis to assess distributed patterns of activity across conditions.  
The mean centered PLS analysis was run in order to examine task-based activity across 
the whole brain. Activity for each voxel was averaged across blocks for each relationship 
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condition and normalized relative to activity at fixation preceding the trait judgment. The data 
matrix was expressed as a voxel-by-voxel deviation from the grand mean across the entire 
experiment, which was decomposed using singular value decomposition to derive the LVs 
representing task contrasts. Each brain voxel was given a singular value weight, known as a 
salience (akin to a component loading in principle component analysis), which is proportional to 
the covariance of voxel activity with the task contrast represented by each LV. Multiplying the 
salience by the BOLD signal value in that voxel and summing the product across all voxels gives 
a composite brain activity score for each participant on a given LV. We then used these brain 
scores to examine similarities and differences in brain activity across conditions and across 
participants. Greater activity in brain areas with positive (or negative) weights on a specific LV 
yields positive (or negative) mean brain scores for a given condition. PLS results can be 
interpreted as identifying co-varying sets of brain regions in which activity is reliably associated 
with the specific condition-wise contrasts represented by each LV.  
Task-related Functional Connectivity 
Task-related functional connectivity analyses were run in order to assess connectivity of 
mPFC, due to this region’s known role in mediating social cognition (for review, see Spreng & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2015). These functional connectivity analyses were also performed using seed 
partial least squares (PLS; Krishnan et al., 2011; McIntosh, 1999). Seed PLS examines whole-
brain functional activity that correlates with activity in a specified seed region. In seed PLS, LVs 
represent a decomposition of the covariance between activity in the seed and in all other brain 
voxels. Since the resultant LVs of seed PLS can identify multiple patterns of functional 
connectivity, this technique uniquely enables assessment of large-scale brain networks. In two-
seed PLS analyses, activity was first extracted from regions of interest (including peak voxel in 
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the present dataset, and 26 neighboring voxels) in dmPFC and vmPFC (MNI coordinates: -6, 54, 
30 and -2, 50, -18, respectively). This extracted activity was correlated across all other brain 
voxels and across all participants. PLS was then implemented to examine how patterns of 
correlation differed between conditions (i.e., romantic partner, parent/child, close friend, 
acquaintance, self, and control) and between young and older adults. 
For the seed PLS analyses, the same set of resampling techniques were applied as 
described above for the task-based PLS. The significance of each LV was determined by 
permutation testing, using 500 permutations with random reordering of the task conditions for 
each participant. PLS is recalculated for each permutation sample, and the frequency in which 
the permuted singular value exceeds the observed singular values is determined and expressed as 
a probability. In a second, independent, step the reliability of the saliences for the brain voxels 
across participants, characterizing each pattern identified by an LV, was determined by bootstrap 
resampling with replacement, using 100 iterations, to estimate the standard errors for each voxel. 
We set a minimum bootstrap ratio (conceptually similar to a Z-score) at 2.58 equivalent to p < 
0.01.  
Results 
Behavioral Results; Assessment of Closeness 
Our first analyses examined two critical measures: reported attachment status (WHOTO) 
and closeness (IOS) between romantic partners, parents/children, and friends. Descriptive 
statistics for these measures can be found in Table 4.1.  
We initially tested for interactions between condition (partner, parent/child, friend) and 
potential age effects, running an omnibus ANOVA test for WHOTO scores and another for IOS 
scores. There was a significant interaction between condition and age (F(3, 52) = 3.28, p = 
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0.028) for WHOTO scores. We further explored the effect of age in this interaction with post-
hoc t-tests comparing young and older adults, within each condition. Older adults showed higher 
attachment as measured by the WHOTO to their partners than did young adults (t(1, 54) = 4.68, 
p = 0.035), whereas young adults showed higher attachment to their parents than older adults to 
their children (t(1, 54) = 4.74, p = 0.034). However, neither of these differences remained 
significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. No differences were observed between the 
age groups for friends t(1, 54) = 1.60, p = 0.211). Lastly, there was no significant interaction 
between condition and age (F(3, 52) = 1.421, p = 0.25) of closeness (IOS scores). 
For the young adults alone, we then conducted repeated measures ANOVA tests across 
WHOTO total scores and across IOS scores. Results showed a significant difference between 
means of romantic partner, parent, and friend WHOTO scores (F(2, 56) = 22.14, p < 0.001). 
Results of non-parametric analyses mirrored these ANOVA results, as a Friedman test yielded 
significant differences among repeated measures χ 2 (2, N = 29) = 40.55, p < 0.001. We 
conducted this non-parametric test to account for alternative perspectives that consider WHOTO 
scores as ordinal data. Results also showed a significant difference between means of romantic 
partner, parent, and friend IOS scores (F(2, 56) = 68.00, p < 0.001). For the older adults, we 
again conducted repeated measures ANOVA tests across these self-report scores. Results showed 
a significant difference between means of romantic partner, child, and friend WHOTO scores 
(F(2, 52) = 127.96, p < 0.001). Results of non-parametric analyses mirrored these ANOVA 
results, as a Friedman test yielded significant differences among repeated measures χ 2 (2, N = 
27) = 44.24, p < 0.001. Results also showed a significant difference between means of romantic 
partner, child, and friend IOS scores (F(2, 52) = 28.17, p < 0.001). Overall, these results 
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confirmed that the target individuals of partner, parent/child, and friend represented differing 
levels of perceived closeness and attachment, for both young and older adults. 
Task Activation 
 In order to examine task-related activation, we ran a mean centered PLS analysis. This 
PLS analysis investigated differences in neural activity between young and older adults, and 
between all social-other conditions (partner, parent or child, friend, and acquaintance), the self, 
and the motor control condition. This task PLS analysis revealed two significant patterns of 
activity, or LVs. 
Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Results of the task PLS analysis. A) LV1 activation map, B) LV1 brain scores with 
95% confidence intervals, C) LV2 activation map, and D) LV2 brain scores with 95% 
confidence intervals. PLS analysis for young (grey bars) and old (dark red bars) contrasted 
activity across partner, parent or child, close friend, familiar acquaintance, self, and control 
conditions. Warm colors on activation maps (shades of orange and yellow) correspond to 
positive brain scores, shown by the plotted bars above 0. Cool colors on activation maps (shades 
of blue) correspond to negative brain scores, shown by the plotted bars below 0. Brain scores 
represent the cross product of the group result image and the individual subject BOLD response 
A B
C D
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for each given LV. For activation maps: (Left) Lateral and medial views of left hemisphere, 
(Center) Dorsal view, (Right) Lateral and medial views of right hemisphere. 
 
 The first significant LV accounted for 68.37% of the crossblock covariance (p = 0.002). 
This LV separated all social other representations and the self from the motor control (number 
matching) condition for both age groups. This result replicates previous findings that have 
implicated the default network in mentalizing about others (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010; Mar, 
2011). Significant activations for this first LV were found within dmPFC, vmPFC, PCC, inferior 
frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, occipital pole, temporal pole, cerebellum, superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), angular gyrus, fusiform gyrus, middle cingulate gyrus, retrosplenial cortex, 
hippocampus, and head of caudate (Figure 4.2, Table 4.2. 
 The second significant LV, accounting for 13.65% of the crossblock covariance (p = 
0.002), showed distinct patterns of activation for young and older participants. In young adults, 
romantic partner and self conditions were differentiated from parent and friend conditions. 
Activations in anterior insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), posterior middle 
cingulate, precuneus, occipital pole, supramarginal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, posterior middle 
temporal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, frontal pole, thalamus, orbitofrontal 
cortex, inferior temporal gyrus, head of caudate, and precentral gyrus were associated with 
partner and self representations, in the young. In the young participants, the acquaintance and 
motor control conditions did contribute to the multivariate pattern of activity evidenced by the 
CIs crossing zero. In contrast, older participants showed a lack of differentiation in patterns of 
neural response across all conditions and, as such, did not contribute to the multivariate pattern 
displayed by young adults (Figure 4.2, Table 4.3). 
 
Task-related Functional Connectivity of MPFC 
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Medial prefrontal cortex is a heterogeneous region central to social cognition. To 
investigate functional connectivity of MPFC, we ran two seed PLS analyses: first for a dmPFC 
seed (Figure 4.3) and second for a vmPFC seed (Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3. Functional connectivity results for dmPFC. A) ROI examining a peak activation seed 
region within dmPFC. Significance is shown through colors within the bar graphs; grey plotted 
bars correspond with young adult significant response intensities, and red plotted bars 
correspond with older adult significant response intensities. B-E) Results of dmPFC seed PLS. 
B) LV1 connectivity map, C) LV1 condition- and group- wise correlations, with 95% confidence 
intervals, between the dmPFC seed region and the whole brain pattern of connectivity D) LV2 
connectivity map, E) LV2 condition and group correlations, with 95% confidence intervals, 
between the dmPFC seed region and the whole brain pattern of connectivity. PLS analysis for 
young (grey bars) and old (dark red bars) contrasted connectivity across partner, parent or child, 
close friend, familiar acquaintance, and self conditions. Correlations represent the relationship 
between brain scores for each condition and activity within the dmPFC seed for each condition. 
Brain scores represent the cross product of the group result image and the individual subject 
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connectivity maps (shades of orange and yellow) correspond to positive brain scores, shown by 
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Partner Parent	/	Child Close	Friend Acquaintance Self Control
dmPFC	seed
Young Old
A
B
D
C
E
  106 
the plotted bars above 0. Cool colors on connectivity maps (shades of blue) correspond to 
negative brain scores, shown by the plotted bars below 0. (Left) Lateral and medial views of left 
hemisphere. (Center) Dorsal view. (Right) Lateral and medial views of right hemisphere. 
 
dmPFC connectivity. The seed PLS analysis for dmPFC revealed two significant LVs: a 
main effect common to both groups and an age interaction. The first significant LV accounted 
for 70.21% of the crossblock covariance (p < 0.000). This LV demonstrated a shared pattern of 
connectivity across both young and older adults, within the DN; the dmPFC seed showed robust 
coactivation with PCC, vmPFC, and STS. Other significant regions functionally connected with 
dmPFC for this LV were observed in middle temporal gyrus, precentral gyrus, posterior superior 
frontal sulcus, collateral sulcus, lateral occipital cortex, occipital pole, cerebellum, inferior 
temporal sulcus, ACC, insula, inferior precentral sulcus, postcentral gyrus, and middle frontal 
gyrus. (See Figure 4.3). 
The second significant LV, accounting for 10.05% of the crossblock covariance (p < 
0.01), showed a pattern of connectivity that differentiated older adults from young adults. Older 
adults demonstrated greater connectivity between the dmPFC seed and bilateral lPFC. Other 
significant regions functionally connected with dmPFC for this LV were inferior frontal gyrus, 
medial premotor cortex, lateral occipital cortex, vmPFC, middle temporal gyrus, 
parahippocampus, precentral gyrus, frontal pole, occipital pole, and cerebellum (See Figure 4.3). 
Connectivity with the dmPFC seed in young adults did not contribute to the multivariate pattern 
of activity for this LV.  
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Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4. Functional connectivity results for vmPFC. A) ROI examining a peak activation seed 
region within vmPFC. Significance is shown through colors within the bar graphs; grey plotted 
bars correspond with young adult significant response intensities, and red plotted bars 
correspond with older adult significant response intensities. B-E) Results of vmPFC seed PLS. 
B) LV1 connectivity map, C) LV1 condition- and group- wise correlations, with 95% confidence 
intervals, between the vmPFC seed region and the whole brain pattern of connectivity D) LV2 
connectivity map, E) LV2 condition and group correlations, with 95% confidence intervals, 
between the vmPFC seed region and the whole brain pattern of connectivity. PLS analysis for 
young (grey bars) and old (dark red bars) contrasted connectivity across partner, parent or child, 
close friend, familiar acquaintance, and self conditions. Correlations represent the relationship 
between brain scores for each condition and activity within the vmPFC seed for each condition. 
Brain scores represent the cross product of the group result image and the individual subject 
BOLD response for each given LV. For connectivity maps B) and D): Warm colors on 
connectivity maps (shades of orange and yellow) correspond to positive brain scores, shown by 
the plotted bars above 0. Cool colors on connectivity maps (shades of blue) correspond to 
negative brain scores, shown by the plotted bars below 0. (Left) Lateral and medial views of left 
hemisphere. (Center) Dorsal view. (Right) Lateral and medial views of right hemisphere. 
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vmPFC Connectivity. The seed PLS analysis for vmPFC also revealed two significant 
LVs: a main effect common to both groups, and an age interaction. The first significant LV 
accounted for 73.03% of the crossblock covariance (p = 0.002). This LV demonstrated a shared 
pattern of connectivity across both young and older adults. Activity in the vmPFC seed was 
positively correlated with activity in PCC/precuneus, ACC, and hippocampus. Other regions that 
were functionally connected with vmPFC along this LV were observed in posterior middle 
temporal gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, middle frontal gyrus, thalamus, temporal pole, 
cerebellum, superior frontal gyrus, temporal pole, frontal pole, posterior supramarginal gyrus, 
occipital pole, temporal and occipital fusiform cortices, frontal orbital cortex, and brain stem 
(See Figure 4.4). Connectivity with the vmPFC seed for young adults thinking about their 
romantic partner did not contribute to the multivariate pattern of activity for this LV.  
The second significant LV, accounting for 7.56% of the crossblock covariance (p < 
0.034), again showed a pattern of connectivity that differentiated older adults from young adults. 
Older adults demonstrated greater connectivity of the vmPFC seed to regions such as precuneus 
and dorsal ACC. Other regions that showed significant functional connectivity with vmPFC for 
older adults only included occipital fusiform gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, occipital pole, frontal 
orbital cortex, cerebellum, superior frontal gyrus, frontal pole, intracalcarine cortex, and lateral 
occipital cortex. Young adults, when thinking about their romantic partner or themselves, 
demonstrated greater connectivity between vmPFC and a different set of regions, such as dmPFC, 
hippocampus, ACC, insula, and caudate. Other regions that demonstrated greater functional 
connectivity with vmPFC for these conditions in young adults were subcallosal cortex, 
postcentral gyrus, parietal and central operculum cortices, SMA, temporal pole, amygdala, 
frontal pole, inferior temporal gyrus, brain stem, parahippocampus, middle temporal gyrus, 
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superior frontal gyrus, and precentral gyrus. (See Figure 4.4). Connectivity with the vmPFC seed 
in young adults thinking about their parent, close friend, or acquaintance did not contribute to the 
multivariate pattern of activity for this LV.  
Discussion 
We investigated patterns of brain activity and connectivity associated with mentalizing 
about known others in younger and older adults, and across levels of social closeness. Consistent 
with our predictions, the modulation of default network connectivity across levels of social 
closeness differed for younger and older adults. Whole-brain results showed that for young, 
default network connections to salience network brain regions differentiated representations of 
close (self, partner) from more distal social others (see Laurita et al., 2017 for an extended 
discussion). Patterns of brain response did not differ by level of social closeness for older adults 
in this analysis. Functional connectivity analyses revealed that for older, but not younger adults, 
two core default network nodes implicated in the representation of known others (Amodio & 
Frith, 2006; Heatherton et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006) were persistently coupled with 
prefrontal brain regions across levels of social closeness. These findings demonstrate that 
accessing distinct neural representations of known others depends on flexible interactions 
between the default network and other large scale brain systems. 
Dedifferentiated representations of social others in older adulthood 
For both age-groups increased activation of dmPFC, vmPFC, and PCC, was observed 
across all social-other conditions, but not the motor control condition. These brain regions form 
part of the “social brain” (Mitchell, 2008) and are core nodes of the default network (Buckner et 
al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). In the whole-brain analysis, default network interactions 
with the salience network in the young group differentiated mentalizing about close versus more 
  110 
distal others. In contrast, default network interactivity was not modulated by social closeness in 
the older group, suggesting that neural representations of social others may become increasingly 
dedifferentiated in later life.  
These results suggest that default network engagement alone may be necessary but 
insufficient to instantiate the full spectrum of relationships in our social milieu. As demonstrated 
in our young group, default network interactions with other brain systems, such as the salience 
network, may be required to form more detailed or differentiated representations of social others. 
While the current study assessed only a single dimension of ‘closeness’ based on levels of 
attachment, there are myriad determinants of how social closeness may be represented in the 
brain (see Thornton and Mitchell, 2017 for a recent discussion). These may include perceptual 
(e.g. personal similarity); affective (e.g. attachment or affection); or more cognitively-based 
discriminations (e.g. demographic or socio-economic factors). While beyond the focus of the 
current report, we suggest that dynamic default network interactions with other large scale brain 
systems implicated in these domains may be necessary to instantiate and update neural 
representations of these complex, multi-dimensional features of social others. 
In this context, here we speculate that the absence of neural differentiation for socially 
close others in the older adult group may reflect reduced flexibility and thus poor interactivity of 
the default network with salience network brain regions which are implicated in close personal 
attachment relationships. There is growing evidence of reduced default network dynamics in 
older adulthood (Spreng and Schacter, 2012; Turner and Spreng, 2015; Rieck et al., 2017). 
Further, we have recently shown that greater intrinsic default network coupling with executive 
brain regions is associated with less detailed or more semanticized autobiographical recollection 
(Spreng et al., in review). Here we suggest that representations of social others may also become 
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less differentiated and more schema-based as default network interactivity is reduced or becomes 
less flexible in later life.  
Default network interactivity and social other representations in older adulthood 
We implemented targeted task-related functional connectivity analyses to investigate age-
related differences in connectivity of two core default network nodes in the dmPFC and vmPFC. 
These regions have been consistently implicated in mentalizing about the identity, characteristics 
or thoughts of known others (Gobbini et al., 2004; Krienen et al., 2010; Moran et al., 2012; 
Thornton and Mitchell, 2017; Hassabis et al., 2014). They also represented peak activations in 
our trait judgment versus control task analysis (Figure 4.2). Consistent with our earlier findings, 
and previous research implicating the default network in mentalizing and social cognition 
(Krienen et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2008), both dmPFC and vmPFC nodes were functionally 
connected with other default network brain regions for all levels of social closeness in both 
groups.  
Critically however, each analysis revealed a second significant pattern of functional 
connectivity that was reliable only in the older adult group. For both seed regions, older adults 
demonstrated functional connectivity with prefrontal regions bilaterally (Figures 4.3D and 4.4D).  
This pattern of age-related recruitment of prefrontal brain regions, and engagement of the default 
network, is commonly observed in neurocognitive aging studies. We have demonstrated that 
these processes are coupled and poorly modulated by task context (Turner and Spreng, 2015) in 
older adults. This pattern of default-executive coupling has now been replicated during both task 
and rest, and is associated with reduced fluid reasoning abilities (Rieck et al., 2017) and 
increased semantic cognition (Spreng et al., submitted) in older adulthood.   
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With respect to the current findings we suggest that engagement of frontal cortices, 
necessary for cognitive control, coupled with default network brain regions, critical for social 
cognition, may support mentalizing about social others in older adulthood. However, as can be 
seen clearly in Figures 3E and 4E, there is no differentiated pattern of functional connectivity 
between these default network seed regions and prefrontal cortices across the continuum of 
social closeness.  As we have argued above, this may reflect reduced default network dynamics 
in older adulthood. In young adults, neural representations of social closeness were associated 
with differentiated patterns of default network coupling. However, in older adults core nodes of 
the default network remained functionally coupled with frontal brain region across all levels of 
social closeness, resulting in dedifferentiated neural representations of social others.   
Here we have shown that the neural representation of close others is altered in older 
versus younger adults. With age, representations across the spectrum of social closeness, from 
the self and romantic partners, to more socially-distant acquaintances, become dedifferentiated. 
We also observed that older adults engage both default network and frontal brain regions while 
mentalizing about known others. We speculated that for older adults, greater control processes 
may be required to mentalize, or access known-other representations. However this 
compensation likely comes at a cost. Greater default – executive coupling and reduced flexible 
interactivity with other large-scale brain systems may result in degraded or poorly differentiated 
representations of personally known others.    
Study limitations 
In the current study we have defined social closeness based on a model of attachment and 
perceived inclusion of other in the self. However, as noted above, there are multiple dimensions 
along which closeness may be stratified, including demographic factors, perceived similarity, 
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fondness, and dyadic relatedness. As suggested recently by Thornton and Mitchell (2017) 
representations of close others based on these different schema may have distinct neural 
signatures and thus represents an interesting and important line of future research. Further, we 
elected to investigate neural network dynamics across the continuum of known others, 
potentially limiting the generalizability of the work to investigations of known versus unknown 
others. We explicitly drew this experimental distinction as we were specifically interested in 
investigating a range of closeness for known others. Adding an anonymous other would have 
represented a categorical distinction that, while theoretically important, was not a primary focus 
of the work. Finally, we recognize the limitations of an extreme groups design and the absence of 
a true lifespan sample. However, we continue to pursue this program with the ultimate goal of 
collecting subject from each decade of life to investigate the network neuroscience of social 
cognition and mentalizing across the full adult lifespan.    
Conclusions and implications  
Taken together, our findings highlight the importance of investigating neural network 
dynamics in the study of neurocognitive aging. In fact our findings suggest that well-established 
network neuroscience models of brain aging may be readily extended to studies of social aging 
neuroscience.  On a final cautionary note, our results raise an important point with respect to 
social cognition in later life. These data suggest that while older adults may be able to recruit 
cognitive control resources to successfully mentalize about others, reduced network dynamics 
may result in degraded social-other representations. These functional brain changes, whether 
occurring in the context of normal aging or brain disease, may lead to inaccurate predictions, and 
thus inadequate cautions, with respect to the actions or intentions of others in their social milieu. 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Measures 
Measure Romantic 
Partner 
Parent/Child Close Friend Acquaintance 
WHOTO (M, SD) 
Out of 40 
 
Young:  
32.83, 6.80 
 
Older: 
36.70, 6.59 
 
Young:  
22.31, 8.46 
 
Older: 
17.04, 9.65 
Young: 
6.97, 7.56 
 
Older: 
4.70, 5.59 
- 
 
 
- 
IOS (M, SD) 
Out of 7 
 
Young:  
4.83, 1.23 
 
Older: 
5.22, 1.45 
Young:  
2.93, 1.39 
 
Older: 
3.52, 1.50 
 
Young:  
2.97, 1.55 
 
Older: 
2.89, 1.53 
Young:  
1.55, 0.69 
 
Older: 
2.30, 1.38 
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Table 4.2. Peak Activation Coordinates, LV1 
Region Coordinates    
 x y z BSR 
Social > Control     
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex -8 54 32 -16.44 
Inferior frontal gyrus -56 24 12 -15.44 
Superior frontal gyrus -4 14 54 -14.84 
Posterior cingulate cortex -6 -54 30 -12.55 
Occipital pole -22 -98 0 -12.02 
Temporal pole -44 6 -38 -11.59 
Cerebellar Crus I 24 -82 -32 -11.46 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex -2 50 -18 -11.23 
Superior temporal sulcus -48 -36 -2 -7.31 
Temporal pole 48 10 -34 -6.97 
Angular gyrus -46 -62 24 -6.70 
Fusiform gyrus -38 -44 -22 -5.03 
Middle cingulate gyrus -2 -14 36 -4.71 
Retrosplenial cortex 18 -48 4 -4.49 
Hippocampus -24 -28 -6 -4.12 
Cerebellar Crus I / Crus II -32 -82 -36 -3.83 
Inferior frontal gyrus 36 22 18 -3.47 
Head of caudate 18 10 14 -3.42 
     
Control > Social     
Middle cingulate gyrus 10 -36 44 12.57 
Superior parietal lobule 34 -48 44 10.50 
MT+ 52 -58 -8 10.45 
Superior parietal lobule -38 -42 42 9.43 
Cerebellar VIIB -18 -74 -46 8.91 
MT+ -52 -60 -6 8.86 
Insula -40 -10 -4 8.45 
Ventral precentral sulcus 50 2 8 7.89 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 36 40 24 7.35 
Frontal eye field 24 8 56 6.61 
Frontal pole 44 40 4 6.56 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex -30 30 34 6.42 
Inferior temporal gyrus -52 -32 -22 6.40 
Cerebellar VIIIB 18 -58 -52 6.24 
Superior frontal gyrus -22 6 56 4.84 
Frontal pole 22 68 -2 3.74 
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Table 4.3. Peak Activation Coordinates, LV2 
Region Coordinates   BSR 
 x y z  
For Young Only: Partner and Self  
> Parent and Friend 
  
Precuneus -8 -68 38 6.71 
Occipital pole -22 -96 -4 6.68 
Supramarginal gyrus 46 -40 32 6.56 
Posterior middle cingulate 8 -24 32 6.54 
Middle frontal gyrus 40 8 54 5.79 
Posterior middle temporal gyrus 52 -50 -4 5.27 
Supramarginal gyrus -42 -48 34 5.21 
Inferior frontal gyrus -60 18 12 4.98 
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 10 30 26 4.95 
Superior frontal gyrus 16 12 52 4.77 
Frontal pole -40 48 10 4.48 
Thalamus 24 -28 0 4.45 
Orbitofrontal cortex -14 30 -24 3.89 
Inferior temporal gyrus -58 -16 -40 3.85 
Head of caudate -12 22 -6 3.84 
Anterior insula 30 18 -8 3.54 
Precentral gyrus 62 16 14 3.36 
Anterior insula -24 24 -6 3.27 
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CHAPTER 5 
Neural signatures of chronic accessibility in parent – adult child attachment bonds 
Our most critical bonds are often formed with our parents and children. These stable 
relationships, often conceptualized as attachment bonds, are characterized by feelings of security 
with affect-regulatory benefits (Hazan et al., 2004; Sroufe & Waters, 1977; Pietromonaco et al., 
2006). Ethological attachment is theorized to necessitate proximity maintenance to caregivers, 
promoting chances of infant survival (Bowlby, 1982). Early observational studies of toddlers 
demonstrated parental attachment figures’ role in soothing separation-related distress upon 
reunion (Ainsworth et al., 1978), and recent work highlights parents’ neurobiological response to 
their children’s distress (Noriuchi et al., 2007; Swain et al., 2014). The parent-child attachment 
bond is uniquely reciprocal, consistently demonstrating biobehavioral synchrony, or the 
sensitization to and coordination of physiological and behavioral responses (Feldman, 2012). 
Moreover, this relationship is capable of persisting as both child and parent age and adapt to 
shifts in behavioral dynamics related to role-reversal (Ainsworth, 1989; Carpenter, 2001).  
 Inherent to parent-child attachment bonds are the mental representations, or internal 
working models, of these figures that come about due to reward conditioning. Lack of perceived 
proximity to an attachment figure engages the mental representation of that figure, providing 
comfort and security. Importantly, attachment figure mental representations exhibit chronic 
accessibility (Andersen, et al. 1990; Baldwin et al., 1993); they are easy to bring to mind and 
readily available for utilization in the face of stressors, requiring fewer cognitive resources 
overall. Because of the powerful reciprocal roles of parental and adult child attachment figures, it 
is likely that their chronically accessible mental representations have unique neural signatures. 
Limited existing work examines patterns of neural activity underlying mentalizing for, or 
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imagining the thoughts and feelings of, these attachment figures. Mothers viewing photos of 
their own child versus an unfamiliar child, recruit insula, amygdala, anterior paracingulate cortex, 
and superior temporal sulcus; mothers viewing an unfamiliar child versus their own show 
increased activity in regions related to attention, including intraparietal sulcus and precuneus, 
and face perception, such as fusiform gyrus (Leibenluft et al., 2004). Young adults making trait 
judgments for parents engage default network regions of dorsomedial and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex (Laurita et al., 2017). Bringing to mind mothers 
versus close friends recruits medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, demonstrating 
that parent-child attachment may modulate engagement of these regions (Wang et al., 2012). 
Research investigating brain activity for chronically accessible parents and children could 
provide crucial support for the cognitive benefits of responsive parenting practices (Feldman, 
2012), especially in clinical populations challenged by social attunement, such as children with 
autism (Baker et al., 2015). 
Here we use fMRI to examine the neural representation of young adults’ parents and 
older adults’ children. We sought to determine how mental representations of parents and 
children are associated with differential patterns of brain activity, modulated by attachment. 
Based on the chronic accessibility of attachment figure mental representations, we predicted that 
bringing to mind attached parents or children would require fewer neural resources, as measured 
by decreased activation across various neural systems as a function of attachment. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were 29 healthy, right-handed young adults (16 females, 13 males; 
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M age = 24 years, SD = 3.5 years) and 27 healthy older adults (12 females, 15 males; M age = 67 
years, SD = 6 years), with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Participants had no 
history of psychiatric, neurological, or other medical illness that could compromise cognitive 
functions. Although data were collected from 59 subjects, 3 subjects were excluded from 
subsequent analyses: 2 young adults for noncompliance and 1 older adult due to brain 
abnormalities. In accordance with the Institutional Review Board of Cornell University, 
participants gave written informed consent prior to scanning. 
Assessment of Attachment to Parent/Child 
We recruited from a pool of eligible individuals, asking that young adult participants 
have a living parent to whom they felt close and older adult participants have an adult child to 
whom they felt close. Participants completed a pre-scan survey about their various personal 
relationships, including their relationships with their specific parent or child. Participants first 
provided one name per relationship condition in response to prompts (see Laurita et al., 2017 for 
information regarding pre-scan survey). This survey included a self-report measure of attachment 
(WHOTO; Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan et al., 1991) and relationship length. The WHOTO is an 
attachment functions measure that determines the people with whom subjects display attachment 
relationships. Items are based on four attachment features: proximity seeking, separation distress, 
safe haven, and secure base. Subjects list up to four most important figures in their lives for each 
of the ten items. The WHOTO can be used in various ways to measure individuals’ attachment to 
others. In the present study, we utilized it as a continuous measure of attachment with parent or 
child (in contrast to attachment with romantic partner and close friend) by scoring each item 
based on the individual’s ranking (highest scores = listed first) and totaling these scores; 
therefore higher WHOTO total scores were indicative of greater levels of attachment. 
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Task and fMRI Design 
 During fMRI scanning, we used a trait-judgment task in which participants were asked to 
think about several people in their lives mentioned by name in the pre-scan survey. Each trial 
contained a trait adjective and a person’s name; participants rated the person on each trait 
adjective, on a scale of 1 (unlike this person) to 3 (very much like this person). Blocks were 
composed of 5 trials in which participants were instructed to hold the person in mind 
continuously while making each trait judgment about that person. Trait judgments were also 
made for a romantic partner, friend, acquaintance, famous person, and the self, but are not 
considered in the current report. See Figure 5.1 for behavioral paradigm. Additional details 
regarding the task and fMRI can be found in the Supplemental Material.  
Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1. Behavioral paradigm, involving trait-judgment task. “Child” condition was shown to 
older adults.  
Magnetic Resonance Image Acquisition 
(child’s name)
thoughtful
1      2      3
child control (number)
...	
+ +
3 sec. + +
(child’s name)
moody
1      2      3
(child’s name)
envious
1      2      3
(child’s name)
quiet
1      2      3
(child’s name)
demanding
1      2      3
1 sec. +
20 sec.
10 sec.
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 Brain imaging data were acquired using a 3T GE Discovery MR750 MRI scanner with a 
32-channel head coil. This MRI scanner was located within the Cornell Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Facility in Ithaca, New York. Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1-weighted 
volumetric MRI magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (TR = 7.7 ms; TE = 3.4 ms; 7° flip 
angle; 1.0 mm voxels with no gap, 176 slices). Five 7 m 40 s experimental runs of blood–oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) functional scans were acquired with a T2*- weighted multi-echo 
imaging pulse sequence (TR = 2000 ms; TEs = 12.7, 27.5, and 43 ms; 77° flip angle; 33 axial 
slices; matrix size = 64 x 64; field of view (FOV) = 240 mm; 33 axial slices; 3.8 mm thick slices).   
Preprocessing of Magnetic Resonance Imaging Data 
 BOLD fMRI data were preprocessed to correct for motion, physiological noise and 
scanner artifacts using Multi-Echo Independent Components Analysis (ME-ICA) with meica.py 
(Kundu et al., 2012). ME-ICA is a method for de-noising fMRI data based on information about 
the T2* decay of the BOLD signal, acquired through multi-echo fMRI. Using ME-ICA, multi-
echo fMRI datasets can be decomposed into independent components before these components 
are categorized as BOLD or noise/non-BOLD. ME-ICA robustly de-noises fMRI data by 
removing all non-BOLD components (Kundu et al., 2012; Lombardo et al., 2016). The BOLD 
fMRI images were normalized to a custom young-old population template derived from 50 
young (25 female; M = 22.02y, SD = 3.13y) and 50 older (25 female; M = 67.14y, SD = 6.7y) 
adults. Included template subjects were selected from an in-house brain bank for low trait motion, 
as recent work has indicated that trait motion can bias structural scans (mean FD = 0.09; 
Savalia et al., 2017). Anatomical images for included subjects were affine registered to MNI 
space using  @toMNI_Awarp before being non-linearly, iteratively aligned 
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using @toMNI_Qwarpar in AFNI.  Data were resampled to 2x2x2-voxel volumetric time-series 
and smoothed with an 8-mm full width half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.  
fMRI Analysis 
Partial Least Squares  
 Analyses were performed using partial least squares (PLS; Krishnan et al., 2011; 
McIntosh et al., 2004), a multivariate functional neuroimaging analysis technique used to 
identify whole-brain patterns of activity that are correlated with task. PLS identifies a set of 
orthogonal latent variables that optimally relate BOLD signal and the experimental design or a 
measure of behavior.  PLS results can be interpreted as identifying covarying sets of brain 
regions in which activity is reliably associated with a specific condition, or where brain activity 
during a condition of interest covaries with offline behavior, such as WHOTO scores.  
For each analysis, the significance of each latent variable was determined by permutation 
testing, using 500 permutations with random reordering of the task conditions for each 
participant. PLS is recalculated for each permutation sample, and the frequency in which the 
permuted singular value exceeds the observed singular values is determined and expressed as a 
probability. The reliability of the saliences for the brain voxels across participants, characterizing 
each pattern identified by a latent variable, was determined by bootstrap resampling with 
replacement, using 100 iterations, to estimate the standard errors for each voxel. We set a 
minimum bootstrap ratio (conceptually similar to a Z-score) at 2.58 equivalent to p < 0.01. In the 
current sample, fifty-six total subjects gives us 80% power to detect effect small effect sizes, r > 
0.25. Because analyses analysis is performed across voxels in a single analytic step, no 
correction for multiple comparisons is required. Additional details regarding PLS can be found in 
the Supplemental Material available online. 
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Results 
Behavioral Results; Assessment of Attachment to Parent/Child  
First, we confirmed that parents and children are significant attachment figures. We note 
that levels of attachment varied across our sample, permitting an assessment of individual 
differences. See Supplemental Material for results of ANOVA tests across WHOTO total scores. 
To compare across parent and child conditions, we also examined length of relationship for 
young adults with their named parent and older adults with their named child. Although our 
sample of parents and children were not related, younger participants’ ages were not significantly 
different from that of the older adults’ children (t(26) = -1.91, p = 0.07, d = 0.55). Although 
developmentally very different, this suggests that the parent-child relationship was of similar 
length between our groups. Descriptive statistics for WHOTO and relationship length are in 
Table 5.1.  
Neuroimaging Results 
 Brain activation during mentalizing about one’s parent or child, relative to the control 
condition, engaged the default network (p = .002; see Supplemental Figure 5.S1), consistent with 
prior reports of mentalizing (e.g., Mar, 2014). Central to the aims of the current study, brain 
activation when mentalizing about one’s parent or child significantly varied as a function of 
attachment (p = .016, 78.08% crossblock covariance explained). A significant negative 
association was observed between WHOTO scores and activity in a number of brain regions. 
Results showed that the more attached one feels to their parent or child, the lower brain activity 
was observed in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), left amygdala hippocampus, anterior and 
posterior insula, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the putative occipital face area (OFA), as 
well as other regions (Figure 5.2; see Table 5.2 for full results).  
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Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Relationship between parent/child attachment and brain activity while mentalizing. 
A) Significant reductions in brain activity as a function of attachment when making trait 
judgments about parent or child. B) Bootstrapped correlation values between a composite 
measure of brain activity and the WHOTO score for each group, revealing similar magnitude of 
covarying activity in both younger and older adults. C) Scatterplot of the association between a 
composite brain activity score (depicted in A) and attachment (measured by the WHOTO).   
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Discussion 
 
The present study identified brain regions whose activity varies as a function of 
attachment. During mentalizing about attachment figures, one’s parents or children, brain 
activity was systematically reduced as a function of perceived closeness. Put another way, when 
we think about our parents or children, reduced brain activity is observed when we are more 
bonded to these figures. Importantly, brain regions identified as showing lower activation with 
higher levels of attachment serve important roles in social navigation (e.g., Tavares et al., 2015). 
This inverse relationship between brain activity and attachment scores provides the first 
empirical support for a neural mechanism underlying the chronic accessibility of attachment 
figure mental representations. Conditioning to the presence of an attachment figure allows us to 
readily access our representations of that person without taxing cognitive and neural resources.  
Mental representations of attached parents and children comprise highly salient 
experiences and, as such, are differentiable from other social mental representations. Decreased 
activation was observed in regions implicated in past findings on attachment figure 
representations. ACC and insula activity is associated with distress and pain alleviation by close 
others (Coan et al., 2006). These regions are involved in the salience network (Seeley et al., 
2016), a collection of brain regions that coordinates responses to meaningful environmental 
stimuli (Uddin, 2015). PCC is a known default network hub, recruited in social cognitive 
processes, such as mentalizing, for close others (e.g., Krienen et al., 2010; Laurita et al., 2017). 
Results of the present study add nuance to the association between default network activity and 
social closeness; one interpretation of the convergence of these findings would be that PCC 
remains online while individuals cognitively represent non-attached social others. Decreased 
activation of left amygdala with greater attachment is likely related to the region’s processing of 
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fear versus safety signals (Phelps et al., 2001). The hippocampal memory system plays a role in 
social cognition, specifically in integrating information on relative social affiliation and power 
(Tavares et al., 2015; for review, see Laurita & Spreng, 2017). Our results provide evidence that 
hippocampus-supported social memory is necessitated only by less chronically accessible close 
others. OFA is putatively implicated in face perception and, particularly, in recognition of 
unfamiliar faces and objects (Gauthier et al., 2000); less recruitment of OFA for attached parents 
and children supports chronic accessibility, as these figures are easily recognizable and highly 
familiar. 
These findings enhance our understanding of the neural representation of some of the 
most important people in our lives—parents and children—and illuminate how attachment 
modulates these representations. The profound impact of attachment figure representations on 
individuals’ affective and physiological regulation (Pietromonaco et al., 2006) and expectations 
for social-other responsiveness in future interactions (Anderson & Cole, 1990) is already well-
documented. The present results provide novel evidence that one critical evolutionary advantage 
of attachment bonds is the conservation of valuable neural and cognitive resources in conferral of 
regulatory benefits. Attachment figures need not be physically present to promote our well-being 
and, by merely bringing them to mind we can alleviate the cognitive load of social processing. 
Future work should explore this neural mechanism for chronic accessibility as it relates to our 
ability to navigate the complex social world around us. 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Measures 
Measure Parent (Young Adults) Child (Older Adults) 
WHOTO (M, SD) 
Out of 40 
 
22.31, 8.46 17.04, 9.65 
Length of Relationship (M, SD) 
In years 
 
22.90, 4.81 29.27, 2.44 
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Table 5.2. Peak Activation Coordinates 
Region Coordinates   BSR 
 x y z  
Decreased activity as a function of  
attachment to Parent or Child 
  
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 14 24 26 7.33 
Brain stem 6 -34 -12 6.71 
Orbitofrontal cortex 2 24 -32 6.44 
Amygdala -22 4 -18 6.20 
Supramarginal gyrus 44 -26 32 6.00 
Posterior insula 42 -14 10 5.77 
Inferior temporal gyrus/ Occipital face area 56 -58 -18 5.66 
Cuneus 4 -86 34 5.35 
Superior parietal lobule -28 -52 46 5.21 
Posterior cingulate cortex 4 -42 40 5.04 
Parahippocampus -18 -12 -30 4.86 
Lateral occipital cortex 44 -64 28 4.85 
Precentral sulcus 42 -4 38 4.81 
Hippocampus 24 -26 -16 4.67 
Superior temporal gyrus 64 -2 -10 4.66 
Occipital fusiform gyrus 28 -82 -18 4.60 
Thalamus -18 -22 -2 4.49 
Fusiform gyrus -32 -36 -20 4.45 
Insula -36 6 18 4.36 
Poster superior temporal sulcus 66 -42 10 4.29 
Anterior fusiform gyrus -30 -2 -48 4.29 
Cerebellar vermis -8 -66 -40 4.22 
Anterior insula 26 22 -2 4.19 
Occipital face area -50 -68 -14 4.13 
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex -14 22 34 4.04 
Precentral gyrus -54 0 2 3.94 
Frontal pole -10 68 -4 3.94 
Orbitofrontal cortex -16 30 -18 3.81 
Precentral gyrus 0 -18 66 3.81 
Superior frontal gyrus -18 34 36 3.79 
Frontal pole 44 54 16 3.78 
Hippocampus -36 -24 -12 3.75 
Lateral occipital cortex 36 -78 4 3.72 
Middle frontal gyrus 30 36 50 3.70 
Lateral occipital cortex 36 -84 24 3.68 
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Supplementary motor area 8 10 56 3.67 
Anterior insula -42 26 10 3.41 
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Supplemental Material 
Task and fMRI Design 
Blocks were interleaved with 10 seconds of fixation. We also included a motor control 
condition block, in which participants were prompted with “Which number?”, shown a number 1, 
2, or 3, and instructed to respond by pushing the button corresponding to that number. 
The experiment consisted of 350 trials divided across 5 runs, each consisting of 14 blocks, in 
turn comprising 5 trials per block. Trials were 3-seconds long, and a 1-second crosshair fixation 
screen appeared between each trial. There were 2 blocks per run for each of the conditions. The 
order of conditions within each run was randomized. Each task run lasted 7 minutes and 40 
seconds. The 5 runs were then counterbalanced for each participant to eliminate any possibility 
of ordering effects of the fixed condition order and adjective order.  
50 trait adjectives were selected for the study in order to ensure that each word was used 
exactly once for each condition. The trait adjectives were selected from a list of popularly used 
personality terms. The trait adjectives were presented in a fixed order across blocks, such that 
each trait adjective was paired exactly once with each condition. 
Partial Least Squares 
PLS is sensitive to a distributed voxel response, rather than the activity of individual 
voxels per se, and assesses the covariance between brain voxels (BOLD signal) and the 
experimental design to identify a limited number of orthogonal components (LVs) that optimally 
relate the two. This data-driven approach determines orthogonal whole-brain patterns of activity 
that covary with the experimental design. Within the PLS framework, brain activity is 
constrained to examine the covariance between brain activity and task design. In this regard, we 
are able to examine robust patterns of activity only associated with the experimental conditions. 
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Along these same lines, PLS is capable of analyzing multiple conditions simultaneously to 
examine covariance of response across conditions. The current study design was optimized for a 
PLS analysis to assess distributed patterns of activity across conditions.  
Activity for each voxel was averaged across blocks for both parent and child conditions 
and normalized relative to activity at fixation preceding the trait judgment. The data matrix was 
expressed as a voxel-by-voxel deviation from the grand mean across the entire experiment, 
which was decomposed using singular value decomposition to derive the LVs representing task 
contrasts. Each brain voxel is given a singular value weight, known as a salience (akin to a 
component loading in principle component analysis), which is proportional to the covariance of 
voxel activity with the task contrast represented by each LV. Multiplying the salience by the 
BOLD signal value in that voxel and summing the product across all voxels gives a composite 
brain activity score for each participant on a given LV.  
Behavioral Results 
We conducted repeated measures ANOVA tests across WHOTO total scores. In the 
young adults, there was a significant difference between means of parent, romantic partner, and 
close friend WHOTO scores (F(2, 56) = 68.00, p < 0.001). Results of non-parametric analyses 
mirrored these ANOVA results, as a Friedman test yielded significant differences among 
repeated measures χ 2 (2, N = 29) = 40.55, p < 0.001. In the older adults, results also showed a 
significant difference between means of child, romantic partner, and close friend WHOTO scores 
(F(2, 52) = 127.96, p < 0.001). Results of non-parametric analyses mirrored these ANOVA 
results, as a Friedman test yielded significant differences among repeated measures χ 2 (2, N = 
27) = 44.24, p < 0.001. We conducted both non-parametric tests to account for alternative 
perspectives that consider WHOTO scores as ordinal data. We ran several post-hoc t-tests to 
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clarify the nature of attachment-related differences between parents/children in comparison to 
participants’ other close social relationships. Young adult participants reported significantly 
greater attachment to parents over friends (t(56) = 7.28, p < 0.001, d = 1.91), and older adults also 
reported significantly greater attachment to children over friends (t(42) = 5.75, p < 0.001, d = 
1.56). Results also showed, however, that young adult participants reported significantly greater 
attachment to romantic partners over parents (t(56) = 5.22 p < 0.001, d = 1.37). Older adult 
participants also reported significantly greater attachment to romantic partners over children (t(46) 
= 8.74, p < 0.001, d = 2.38). Taken together, these results demonstrate that participants’ parents 
or children served as attachment figures, whereas close friends were not attachment figures for 
our participants. 
Neuroimaging Results 
The supplementary task PLS analysis investigated neural activity for parent or child and 
motor control conditions. This PLS analysis revealed one significant pattern of activity, or latent 
variable. This significant LV accounted for 91.53% of the crossblock covariance (p < 0.000). 
Brain scores for parent and child conditions covaried against the control condition. Significant 
activations for this LV were found within ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, 
posterior cingulate cortex, superior temporal sulcus, inferior frontal gyrus, occipital pole, 
cerebellum, caudate, lateral occipital cortex, frontal orbital cortex, brain stem, and temporal 
occipital fusiform cortex. (Figure 5.S1).  
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Figure 5.S1. 
 
Figure 5.S1. Results of the PLS analysis comparing activity across parent/child and control 
conditions; LV Activation map (Top) and brain scores with 95% confidence intervals (Bottom). 
Cool colors on activation maps (shades of blue) correspond to negative brain scores. For 
activation map: (Left) Lateral and medial views of left hemisphere. (Center) Dorsal view. (Right) 
Lateral and medial views of right hemisphere. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
 The present dissertation investigated the neural representation of close others across 
adulthood. Chapter 2 demonstrated the applicability of attachment theory in understanding how 
cognitive representations of close others might be vastly different from other social neural 
representations. In addition, this review highlighted the variety of neuroimaging findings 
resulting from and methods involved in past research. Finally, this chapter provided 
recommendations for the emerging field of close relationship neuroscience. Chapter 3 served as 
an initial empirical test of the premises laid out in Chapter 2. Making trait judgments for known 
others along a spectrum of closeness resulted in differential brain activity, and attachment was a 
distinguishing feature of these differences. Chapter 4 extended this line of research further, into 
social aging neuroscience, as it investigated mentalizing for known others in both young and 
older adults. Neural representations of close others became less differentiated in older adulthood, 
and connectivity patterns showed differential coupling in older adults, as well. Chapter 5 directly 
investigated the modulatory effect of attachment on brain activity for parents and adult children. 
Bringing to mind one’s attached parent or child required less engagement across a variety of 
brain regions, which provided preliminary evidence for unique neural signatures of chronic 
accessibility. Directions for future research specific to each line of work have been discussed in 
each of the preceding chapters, respectively. The last section of this dissertation raises broader 
directions for promising research related to findings presented in the previous four chapters. 
Methodological Advancements in the Study of Neural Representations of Close Others 
 The literature discussed in Chapter 2 provided evidence for how the brain represents 
close social others; however, this review also gave insight into all that we still do not know. First, 
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it will be crucial to apply an interdisciplinary, multi-method approach for mapping the neural 
representation of real-world attachment figures. Across Chapters 3, 4, and 5, a consistent fMRI 
paradigm involving trait-judgment for known others was utilized; findings were, therefore, 
inherently reflective of this specific manner in which participants were asked to bring to mind 
their close others. As recognized in Chapter 2, a trait judgment task like this is only one of many 
potential tasks that can effectively examine neural representations of close others using fMRI. 
Future studies could draw upon paradigms designed and tested by past work, such as the 
induction of threat accompanied by actual or simulated presence of attachment figures (e.g., 
Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Eisenberger et al., 2011). Researchers should also consider 
designing new tasks fundamentally grounded in the tenets of attachment theory. As one example, 
participants could be asked to engage with a virtual social reality, wherein they have to make 
decisions to interact with their environment in a manner behaviorally similar to “exploration”. 
Throughout the experiment, decision-making could be systematically paired with sensory cues of 
relationship partner presence. This type of paradigm could be tested by an event-related fMRI 
design and would still have great ecological validity. 
Future research could also combine methods from the social psychological and human 
neurobiological traditions to gather more nuanced information about participants. Daily diary 
studies provide important self-report data detailing individuals’ everyday interpersonal 
experiences (e.g., Selcuk et al., 2015). Double-blind placebo-controlled administration of 
important neurochemicals, such as intranasal oxytocin (e.g., Ditzen et al., 2009), remains a gold 
standard for testing the direct manipulation of brain response to environmental stimuli. Chapters 
3 and 5 demonstrated that there exist unique neural signatures of some of our most salient 
attachment figures — romantic partners and parents/children, respectively. This line of research 
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would greatly benefit from dyadic or “couples” studies, wherein data are collected from both 
members of a partner pair. Combining this method with fMRI techniques, for example, could 
shed light on affective coregulation within attachment bonds and its relationship to patterns of 
functional brain activity. Investigations of dyads would also allow for assessment of 
biobehavioral synchrony (see Feldman, 2016 for review), and this research could be further 
extended to examine neural synchrony using correlational methods from social-cognitive 
neuroscience (e.g., Dikker et al., 2014; Hasson et al., 2004).  
Implications for Well-Being and Health in Normative and Clinical Populations  
It is well-documented that close relationships in adulthood have profound effects on 
overall well-being and health (Carstensen et al., 1996; Cohen, 2004; Cornwell & Waite, 2009; 
Hoppmann & Gerstorf, 2009; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 
2001; Steptoe et al., 2013). However, relatively little research to date has been devoted to 
investigating the neural and cognitive representation of such bonds throughout the life course. 
Chapter 4 directly focuses on the effects of aging on neural representations of known others, 
along a spectrum of closeness and attachment. Future research should maintain this 
developmental focus and seek to cover all periods of the lifespan. This line of work could 
include longitudinal studies of individuals and their dynamic close relationships across time, as 
some have begun to examine (Xu et al., 2012). Another avenue for future work that is more 
translational in nature would involve promoting social connectedness and health behaviors 
(Umberson et al. 2010) as fundamental components of brain health into older adulthood. Also, 
research investigating brain activity for parents and children, as in Chapter 5, could serve to 
inform the public of the cognitive benefits for children of responsive parenting practices 
(Feldman, 2012). Ideally, future work on these topics will also have the resources to sample 
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more inclusively from vastly understudied populations, such as individuals who identify with 
gender, sexual orientation, and racial minorities, as well as clinical and non-normative 
populations. Future research across the fields of psychology, sociology, and human neuroscience 
could certainly shed light on the universal health and psychological benefits of chronically 
accessible attachment figure mental representations. 
Concluding Remarks 
Integrating ethological attachment theory with current fMRI methods, the present studies 
systematically investigated the neural representation of close relationship partners across 
adulthood. Collectively, these results make an important contribution to our growing 
understanding of just how significant our closest relationships can be, at the level of physiology. 
Past research has already demonstrated that, as part of attachment bonds, close others become 
integrated into one’s sense of self (Aron et al., 1991) and “under [one’s] skin” (Pietromonaco, 
DeBuse, & Powers, 2013). Findings from the present studies assert another critical layer—that of 
unique neural representation—to these important processes of close relationship formation and 
maintenance. 
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Appendix 2.A. 
	
Relationships and Brain Function Study     
 
Please complete the following brief survey at least 24 hours in advance of your scanning session. 
 
 
Important People in Your Life  
 
Below you are asked to list people who are significant in your life. Rather than providing their 
names, answer with a term that defines how they are related to you (e.g., mother, boyfriend, 
sister). If you write in more than one person, list them in order of significance, starting with the 
most significant. 
 
Note:   
1.  Please DO NOT use terms like “family” or “friends” that refer to more than one person.   
2. If you are including more than one “friend”/”housemate”/etc. on your list, please specify 
which individual you are referring to (i.e., friend1, friend2, and so on).   
3.  There is no need to fill in all of the boxes. 
 
 
1. Person(s) who should be contacted in case of an emergency involving you. 
 
A:  
 
B:  
 
C: 
 
D: 
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2. Person(s) whose absence make you feel like something is not quite right. 
 
A:  
 
B: 
 
C:  
 
D: 
 
3. Person(s) you are most likely to tell when something good happens to you. 
 
A:  
 
B:  
 
C:  
 
D:  
 
4. Person(s) you can hardly imagine your life without. 
 
A:  
 
B:  
 
C: 
 
D: 
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5. Person(s) you immediately think of contacting when something bad happens. 
 
A: 
 
B: 
 
C: 
 
D: 
 
6. Person(s) you know always want the best for you. 
 
A: 
 
B: 
 
C: 
 
D: 
 
7. Person(s) you know will always be there for you. 
 
A: 
 
B: 
 
C: 
 
D: 
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8. Person(s) you make sure to see or talk to frequently. 
 
A: 
 
B: 
 
C: 
 
D: 
 
9. Person(s) you miss when they are away. 
 
A: 
 
B: 
 
C: 
 
D: 
 
10. Person(s) you seek out when worried or upset. 
 
A: 
 
B: 
 
C: 
 
D: 
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The following questions are relevant to your romantic partner.    
 
1. What is your partner's first name? 
 
 
2. How long have you been in a relationship your partner?  Please give answer in 
number of months:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the below questions, please put an “X” next to the option that reflects your response: 
 
How well would you say you know your partner? 
m not at all well ______ 
m slightly well  ______ 
m somewhat well ______ 
m moderately well _____ 
m extremely well ______ 
 
How familiar are you with your partner? 
m not at all familiar ______ 
m slightly familiar ______ 
m somewhat familiar ______ 
m moderately familiar ______ 
m extremely familiar ______ 
 
To what extent would you consider your partner to be influential in your life? 
m not at all influential ______ 
m slightly influential ______ 
m neutral ______ 
m moderately influential ______ 
m extremely influential ______ 
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How emotionally invested in your partner would you say you are? 
m not at all invested ______ 
m slightly invested ______ 
m somewhat invested ______ 
m moderately invested ______ 
m extremely invested ______
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Please respond to the following items with your romantic partner in mind. For each 
item/row please place an “X” in the box that reflects your response. 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
I feel our love 
is based on a 
deep and 
abiding 
friendship.  
     
I express my 
love for my 
partner 
through the 
enjoyment of 
common 
activities and 
mutual 
interests.  
     
My love for 
my partner 
involves solid, 
deep affection.  
     
An important 
factor in my 
love for my 
partner is that 
we laugh 
together.  
     
My partner is 
one of the 
most likable 
people I know.  
     
The 
companionship 
I share with 
my partner is 
an important 
part of my 
love for 
him/her.  
     
I feel I can 
really trust my 
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partner.  
I am able to 
count on my 
partner in 
times of need.  
     
I feel relaxed 
and 
comfortable 
with my 
partner.  
     
 
We are interested in learning more about your relationship with your romantic partner.  Below 
are pairs of circles. In each pair, one circle represents you and the other circle represents this 
person. Please put an “X” next to the number that corresponds with the pair of circles best 
describing your relationship. 
 
m 1 ____ 
m 2 ____ 
m 3 ____ 
m 4 ____ 
m 5  ____ 
m 6  ____ 
m 7  ____ 
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The following statements concern your feelings about your current romantic partner or 
your current romantic relationship. For each item/row please place an “X” in the box that 
reflects your response. 
 
 
 not at 
all  
slightly   somewhat   neutral   moderately   very extremely  
How 
committed 
are you to 
your current 
romantic 
relationship?  
       
How 
sexually 
exclusive is 
your current 
romantic 
relationship?  
       
How 
satisfied are 
you with 
your current 
romantic 
relationship?  
       
How 
satisfied are 
you with 
your current 
romantic 
partner?  
       
How 
attracted to 
this person 
are you?  
       
 
  164 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your 
romantic partner. For each item/row please place an “X” in the box that reflects your 
response. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Every 
little thing 
reminds 
me of this 
person.  
       
My 
friends 
probably 
think I 
talk about 
this 
person too 
much.  
       
I have to 
stop 
myself 
from 
talking 
about this 
person all 
the time.  
       
I spend a 
lot of time 
analyzing 
everything 
this 
person 
says and 
does.  
       
I am 
always 
trying to 
figure out 
how this 
person 
feels 
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about me.  
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For each 
item/row 
please 
place an 
“X” in the 
box that 
reflects 
your 
response. 
 
Not at 
all 
true 
(1)  
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) Definitely 
true (9) 
I would feel 
deep despair 
if my 
partner left 
me. 
         
Sometimes I 
feel I can’t 
control my 
thoughts; 
they are 
obsessively 
on my 
partner.  
         
I feel happy 
when I am 
doing 
something 
to make my 
partner 
happy.  
         
I would 
rather be 
with my 
partner than 
anyone else.  
         
I’d get 
jealous if I 
thought my 
partner  
were falling 
in love with 
someone 
else.  
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I yearn to 
know all 
about my 
partner . 
         
I want my 
partner 
physically, 
emotionally, 
mentally.  
         
I have an 
endless 
appetite for 
affection 
from my 
partner.  
         
For me, my 
partner  is 
the perfect 
romantic 
partner.  
         
I sense my 
body 
responding 
when my 
partner  
touches me.  
         
My partner 
always 
seems to be 
on my 
mind.  
         
I want my 
partner  to 
know me--
my 
thoughts, 
my fears, 
and my 
hopes.  
         
I eagerly 
look for 
signs 
indicating 
my 
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partner ’s 
desire for 
me.  
I possess a 
powerful 
attraction 
for my 
partner.  
         
I get 
extremely 
depressed 
when things 
don't go 
right in my 
relationship 
with my 
partner.  
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Please take a moment to think about how you feel, think, and behave in your current romantic 
relationship.  The items below refer specifically to your feelings in relation to your current 
romantic partner.  Using the rating scale provided, indicate how much you agree/disagree with 
each statement listed below. For each item/row please place an “X” in the box that reflects 
your response. 
 
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Somewha
t 
Disagree 
Neutral 
/Mixed  
Somewha
t Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
I worry that 
my partner 
thinks that I 
don’t 
measure up 
to other 
people. 
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I feel 
comfortable 
sharing my 
private 
thoughts 
and feelings 
with my 
partner.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I worry a lot 
about my 
relationship 
with my 
partner.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I find it 
difficult to 
allow 
myself to 
depend on 
my partner.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I often 
worry that 
my partner 
doesn't 
really love 
me.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
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I am very 
comfortable 
being close 
to my 
partner.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I worry that 
my partner 
doesn't care 
about me.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I don't feel 
comfortable 
opening up 
to my 
partner.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
My partner 
makes me 
doubt 
myself.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
I prefer not 
to show my 
partner how 
I feel deep 
down.  
m  m  m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following questions are relevant to your mother/father OR child. 
 
Please choose the parent or child to whom you feel closest.    
 
 
1. What do you normally refer to this parent or child as (e.g. "mom", "dad', child's name)? 
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2. How well would you say you know this parent / child? 
o not at all well ___ 
o slightly well ___ 
o somewhat well ___ 
o moderately well ___ 
o extremely well ___ 
 
3. How familiar are you with this parent / child? 
o not at all familiar ___ 
o slightly familiar ___ 
o somewhat familiar ___ 
o moderately familiar ___ 
o extremely familiar ___ 
 
4. To what extent would you consider this parent / child to be influential in your life? 
o not at all influential  ___ 
o slightly influential  ___ 
o neutral  ___ 
o moderately influential  ___ 
o extremely influential  ___ 
 
5. How emotionally invested in this parent / child would you say you are? 
o not at all invested ___ 
o slightly invested ___ 
o somewhat invested ___ 
o moderately invested ___ 
o extremely invested ___  
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We are interested in learning more about your relationship with your parent / child, as specified 
above.  Below are pairs of circles. In each pair, one circle represents you and the other circle 
represents this person. Please choose the number that corresponds with the pair of circles best 
describing your relationship. 
 
m 1 ____ 
m 2 ____ 
m 3 ____ 
m 4 ____ 
m 5  ____ 
m 6  ____ 
m 7  ____ 
m  
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Please think of a close friend of yours who is the same gender as you are.  This person should be 
someone you have a current, positive (non-romantic) relationship with.  If possible, try to think 
of a friend you have known for about as long as you have known your romantic partner, named 
above.      
 
The following questions are relevant to this close friend.    
 
 
1. What is your close friend's first name? 
 
 
 
 
2. How long have you known and interacted with your close friend?  Please give answer in 
number of months. 
 
 
3. How well would you say you know your close friend? 
o not at all well ___ 
o slightly well ___ 
o somewhat well ___ 
o moderately well ___ 
o extremely well ___ 
m  
4. How familiar are you with your close friend? 
o not at all familiar ___ 
o slightly familiar ___ 
o somewhat familiar ___ 
o moderately familiar ___ 
o extremely familiar ___ 
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5. To what extent would you consider your close friend to be influential in your life? 
o not at all influential ___ 
o slightly influential ___ 
o neutral ___ 
o moderately influential ___ 
o extremely influential ___ 
m  
6.  How emotionally invested in your close friend would you say you are? 
o not at all invested ___ 
o slightly invested ___ 
o somewhat invested ___ 
o moderately invested ___ 
o extremely invested ___ 
 
 
 
 
  175 
Please respond to the following items with your close friend in mind. For each item/row please 
place an “X” in the box that reflects your response. 
 
 Strongly 
Agree  
Agree  Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree  
I feel our love 
is based on a 
deep and 
abiding 
friendship. 
m  m  m  m  m  
I express my 
love for my 
friend through 
the enjoyment 
of common 
activities and 
mutual 
interests.  
m  m  m  m  m  
My love for 
my friend 
involves solid, 
deep affection.  
m  m  m  m  m  
An important 
factor in my 
love for my 
friend is that 
we laugh 
together.  
m  m  m  m  m  
My friend is 
one of the 
most likable 
people I know.  
m  m  m  m  m  
The 
companionship 
I share with 
my friend is an 
important part 
of my love for 
him/her.  
m  m  m  m  m  
I feel I can 
really trust my 
friend.  
m  m  m  m  m  
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I am able to 
count on my 
friend in times 
of need.  
m  m  m  m  m  
I feel relaxed 
and 
comfortable 
with my 
friend.  
m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
Q268 We are interested in learning more about your relationship with your close friend.  Below 
are pairs of circles. In each pair, one circle represents you and the other circle represents this 
person. Please choose the number that corresponds with the pair of circles best describing your 
relationship. 
m 1 ____ 
m 2 ____ 
m 3 ____ 
m 4 ____ 
m 5  ____ 
m 6  ____ 
m 7  ____ 
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Please think of a familiar acquaintance of yours.  This person should be someone who plays a 
neutral, minor role in your life.  Again, try to pick someone that you have known for about as 
long as your romantic partner and close friend but is significantly less close to you.    
 
 
 
The following questions are relevant to this familiar acquaintance.    
 
 
1. What is your familiar acquaintance's first name? 
 
 
2. How long have you known and interacted with your familiar acquaintance?  Please give 
answer in number of months. 
 
3. How well would you say you know your familiar acquaintance? 
o not at all well ___ 
o slightly well ___ 
o somewhat well ___ 
o moderately well ___ 
o extremely well ___ 
 
4. How familiar are you with your familiar acquaintance? 
o not at all familiar ___ 
o slightly familiar ___ 
o somewhat familiar ___ 
o moderately familiar ___ 
o extremely familiar ___ 
 
5. To what extent would you consider your familiar acquaintance to be influential in your 
life? 
o not at all influential ___ 
o slightly influential ___ 
o neutral___ 
o moderately influential ___ 
o extremely influential ___ 
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6. How emotionally invested in your familiar acquaintance would you say you are? 
o not at all invested ___ 
o slightly invested ___ 
o somewhat invested ___ 
o moderately invested ___ 
o extremely invested ___  
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We are interested in learning more about your relationship with your familiar 
acquaintance.  Below are pairs of circles. In each pair, one circle represents you and the other 
circle represents this person. Please choose the number that corresponds with the pair of circles 
best describing your relationship. 
m 1 ____ 
m 2 ____ 
m 3 ____ 
m 4 ____ 
m 5  ____ 
m 6  ____ 
m 7  ____ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please think of a famous person of the opposite gender, and fill in his or her name here: 
___________ 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this portion of the study!  
 
Please enter your participant number (emailed to you) in the box below.We will see you for your 
session in the scanner soon. 
 
Participant ID number:  	 		
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Appendix 3.A. 
Name Prompts for Each Condition 
 
Romantic partner: “What is your partner’s first name?” 
 
Parent: “Please choose the parent to whom you feel closest. What do you normally refer to this 
parent as (e.g. ‘mom’, ‘dad')?” 
 
Close friend: “Please think of a close friend of yours who is the same gender as you are.  This 
person should be someone you have a current, positive (non-romantic) relationship with.  If 
possible, try to think of a friend you have known for about as long as you have known your 
romantic partner, named above.”  
 
Familiar acquaintance: “Please think of a familiar acquaintance of yours.  This person should be 
someone who plays a neutral, minor role in your life.  Again, try to pick someone that you have 
known for about as long as your romantic partner and close friend but is significantly less close 
to you.”. 
 
Famous person: “Please think of a famous person of the opposite gender, and fill in his or her 
name here.” 
 
Relationship Questionnaire (Partner) 
 
The following questions are relevant to your romantic partner.    
 
3. What is your partner's first name? 
 
 
4. How long have you been in a relationship your partner?  Please give answer in 
number of months:  
 
 
 
How well would you say you know your partner? 
m not at all well ______ 
m slightly well  ______ 
m somewhat well ______ 
m moderately well _____ 
m extremely well ______ 
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How familiar are you with your partner? 
m not at all familiar ______ 
m slightly familiar ______ 
m somewhat familiar ______ 
m moderately familiar ______ 
m extremely familiar ______ 
 
To what extent would you consider your partner to be influential in your life? 
m not at all influential ______ 
m slightly influential ______ 
m neutral ______ 
m moderately influential ______ 
m extremely influential ______ 
 
How emotionally invested in your partner would you say you are? 
m not at all invested ______ 
m slightly invested ______ 
m somewhat invested ______ 
m moderately invested ______ 
extremely invested ______ 
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The following statements concern your feelings about your current romantic partner or your 
current romantic relationship. 
 
 not at 
all  
slightly   somewhat   neutral   moderately   very extremely  
How 
committed 
are you to 
your current 
romantic 
relationship?  
       
How 
sexually 
exclusive is 
your current 
romantic 
relationship?  
       
How 
satisfied are 
you with 
your current 
romantic 
relationship?  
       
How 
satisfied are 
you with 
your current 
romantic 
partner?  
       
How 
attracted to 
this person 
are you?  
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Appendix 4.A. 
Name Prompts for Each Condition 
 
Romantic partner: “What is your partner’s first name?” 
 
Parent / Child: “Please choose the parent or child to whom you feel closest. What do you 
normally refer to this parent as (e.g. ‘mom’, ‘dad’, child’s name)?” 
 
Close friend: “Please think of a close friend of yours who is the same gender as you are.  This 
person should be someone you have a current, positive (non-romantic) relationship with.  If 
possible, try to think of a friend you have known for about as long as you have known your 
romantic partner, named above.”  
 
Familiar acquaintance: “Please think of a familiar acquaintance of yours.  This person should be 
someone who plays a neutral, minor role in your life.  Again, try to pick someone that you have 
known for about as long as your romantic partner and close friend but is significantly less close 
to you.”. 
 
Famous person: “Please think of a famous person of the opposite gender, and fill in his or her 
name here.” 
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Appendix 4.B. 
List of Trait Adjectives 
 
Shy  
Modest  
Sociable  
Stubborn  
Clever  
Unobservant  
Sympathetic  
Competent  
Attentive  
Argumentative  
Persuasive  
Distrustful  
Insecure  
Pleasant  
Helpful  
Emotional  
Sarcastic  
Systematic  
Hot-tempered  
Sincere  
Moody  
Demanding  
Thoughtful  
Sensible  
Envious  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forgiving  
Quiet  
Curious  
Talkative  
Nervous  
Diligent  
Irresponsible  
Critical  
Bold  
Comical  
Easygoing  
Persistent  
Irritating  
Self-assured  
Impulsive  
Imaginative  
Friendly  
Fearful  
Indecisive  
Practical  
Energetic  
Forgetful  
Idealistic  
Gullible  
Reliable  		
 
